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A Cultural Models Approach for Investigating the Cognitive Basis of 
Terrorism
by Winston R. Sieck
Principal Scientist, Culture and Cognition Group
Applied Research Associates
Abstract
Terrorists attempt to communicate specific aspects of their ideological frameworks to shape the 
common perspective of their intended audiences.  For the approach to be successful, the ideas 
they  are promoting must fit within the cultural meaning systems shared across the population 
they  are addressing. Knowing what messages will effectively persuade their constituents is likely 
intuitive for terrorists operating within their own cultural environment, but not necessarily for 
researchers who come from distinct cultural backgrounds.  A method is thus described for 
studying in detail the common perspective that members of a culture bring to a situation. The 
method results in models of the culture that provide a basis for outsiders to begin to frame events 
from the cultural-insider point of view.  The cultural models can then be used as an aid to 
anticipate how messages will be interpreted and evaluated by terrorists and their audiences.
Keywords:  Cultural epidemiology, mental models, political violence, terrorist mind, jihad, Islam
The purpose of this paper is to describe an approach to cultural modelling, cultural network 
analysis (CNA), and its application to terrorism research. Cultural network analysis builds on a 
foundation of research practices drawn from the fields of cognitive anthropology, cultural and 
cognitive psychology, and decision analysis. It improves upon current cultural research 
techniques by providing a systematic method for constructing cultural models for groups, 
organisations, or wider societies. The essential idea is that, by studying in detail the common 
perspective that members of a culture bring to a situation, a model of the culture can be 
constructed that provides a basis for an outsider to begin to frame events from their point of 
view.  The model can then be used for a variety  of purposes, such as an aid to anticipating how 
messages will be interpreted and evaluated by members of the culture. Cultural models derived 
by CNA are represented graphically  as a network of the culturally-shared concepts, causal 
beliefs, and values that  influence key decisions in a particular context[1]. In their most fully 
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developed form, cultural models also convey detailed quantitative information about the 
prevalence of their specific components.  In order to establish a context for addressing 
contributions that cultural modelling can make to terrorism research, we briefly  review progress 
made in understanding terrorism more generally. 
Advances in understanding the reasons behind jihadist terrorism have been made in the last 
several years, though the evidential research base remains thin[2]. Generally, terrorist support 
and recruitment are not due to any single causal factor, but instead stem from the interplay 
between political aspirations of terrorist groups, vulnerable individuals, employment of jihadist 
ideology, and wider social support for terrorism. These latter components increasingly depend on 
a variety of modern modes of communication that are used to propagate the group vision of the 
world to a broad set of constituents. The overall communication strategies of jihadist terrorist 
organisations can be generally characterised as to:
1. motivate ordinary persons to carry out terrorist acts to meet the organisation’s objectives;
2. exploit moral outrage and feelings of humiliation based on political events;
3. convince by means of religious texts used on behalf of terror ideology.
We discuss each of these components of terrorist strategy in turn. First, with respect to profiles of 
individuals, what research there is indicates that  suicide terrorists have no appreciable 
psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well-off as their surrounding 
populations[3]. Furthermore, education does not appear to be correlated with support for 
terrorism. Finally, although economic despair may provide a partial answer, it does not offer a 
complete explanation[4]. Importantly, individuals who are vulnerable to terrorist  recruitment are 
not motivated to take part in suicide terrorism without some form of ideology to guide them, as 
well as an overall organisation to support their activities[5]. 
The balance of evidence suggests that terrorists tend to be from at least moderately religious 
backgrounds. For example, interviews with terrorist recruits in Pakistan indicated that, “None 
were uneducated, desperately poor, simple minded or depressed,” and “all were deeply 
religious.” They believed that their acts were “sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of 
Islam”[6]. Furthermore, it also seems clear that religiosity is fostered as a part of the 
indoctrination process and those external events can trigger greater attention to religion. For 
example, Bosnian Muslims typically report not considering religious affiliation a significant part 
of identity until seemingly arbitrary  violence forced awareness upon them[7].  This is not  to 
suggest that the root of terrorist motive is religion, only  that religious beliefs and values form an 
important component of jihadist groups’ descriptions of their world. 
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The second component of jihadist terrorist  strategy is exploitation of public emotional responses 
to political events. Terrorist organisations appear to be quite sophisticated in their use of modern 
media, including use of the World Wide Web to disseminate vivid imagery of moral wrongdoing 
by Americans and other agents of the West. Furthermore, humiliating and morally  outrageous 
events are not considered isolated or random, but rather are interpreted within an overarching 
framework that a unified Western strategy exists to promote a “war against Islam”[8]
The third component of terrorist strategy is ensuring that  recruits are so thoroughly convinced 
that they won’t consider backing out, let alone feel any mercy or remorse about their actions. For 
a suicide terrorist in particular, this means they will act with no doubt about their decision to die 
in order to kill others[9]. For example, the fully indoctrinated terrorist  has been described as 
being completely free of any ambiguity  or doubt about the mission or the means to accomplish it
[10]. This religious conviction includes a fundamental belief that the terrorist knows the mind of 
God. Such a belief justifies a complete lack of tolerance for divergent ideas, even of other 
believers who disagree with the terrorist group on specific issues (i.e., the true believer exists 
apart from all others). 
Each of these strategies relies heavily on terrorist communication of specific aspects from their 
ideological framework to shape the common perspective of their intended audiences.  For the 
approach to be successful, the ideas they  are promoting must fit  within the cultural meaning 
systems shared across the population they are addressing.  One application of cultural modelling 
to terrorism research is to explicitly map out the relevant cultural meaning systems in order to 
better understand how and why various messages appear to be effective in influencing people’s 
attitudes and garnering their support.  Before addressing culture in terrorism, however, we first 
need to define culture.
Concept of Culture
There is a somewhat natural tendency to talk about  culture as if it were a concrete, material 
thing. It is sometimes described as something people belong to, or as an external substance or 
force that surrounds its members and guides their behaviour.  Although it is sometimes difficult 
to avoid speaking in these metaphorical terms, such an ethereal view does not provide a useful 
basis for a technical definition. An alternative approach begins by  defining culture in terms of the 
widely  shared ideas (such as concepts, values, and beliefs) that comprise a shared symbolic 
meaning system [11].  Within this conception, approximately  equivalent and complementary 
learned meanings are maintained by  a population, or by identifiable segments of a population.  In 
this statement, ‘approximately equivalent’ acknowledges that no two people within a culture 
share exactly the same ideas, but rather highly-similar meanings are shared by most members of 
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a society. The ‘complementary’ component refers to the fact that sharing of specialised 
knowledge depends on status and roles within a society (e.g. an imam and farmer).
Taking this conception a step further, it is currently  popular within cognitive science to draw on a 
disease metaphor for understanding cultural ideas, describing the ideas that spread widely 
through a population and persist for substantial periods of time as especially  ‘contagious’[12]. 
This theoretical framework is often referred to as the epidemiological view of culture, drawing 
on the general sense of epidemiology as describing and explaining the distributions of any 
property  within a population.  The starting point for working from this epidemiological view is 
the individual idea as an atomic unit.  People typically use the word idea to refer to any content 
of the mind, including conceptions of how things are and of how things should be.  For instance, 
individuals may hold the concept that Western nations are joined together in a covert war against 
Islam.  Their minds may also contain the value that imported Western ideals, such as the 
separation of religious and state affairs, are generally bad and so should be avoided.  Ideas are 
often treated as independent units by  social scientists, or grouped together into categories of 
belief for simplicity.  A key premise of the current  approach is that cultural knowledge consists 
of shared networks of ideas, and that there is value in explicitly considering clusters of ideas and 
their interrelationships. Networks of causally-interconnected ideas are often referred to as folk 
theories or mental models [13].  Such networks constitute people’s explanations for how things 
work, and result in judgments and decisions that influence their behaviour.  
From this perspective culture refers to mental models, and other contents of the mind, for which 
there is some level of concordance across members of a population over a period of time.  A 
potential issue associated with this definition of culture is how, then, to define the population of 
interest.  The term cultural group refers to a population or sub-population of people that largely 
share the interconnected ideas of interest.  The issue is that cultural groups are distinct from, but 
related to, demographic groups (i.e. groups based on nationality, educational status, etc.) in that 
the demographic delineations relevant to a particular cultural group will depend on how 
widespread the cultural ideas of interest are.  For example, Sunni and Shia sectarian distinctions 
make little difference if the idea of interest is, “There is no god but Allah, and Mohammad is his 
prophet.”  However, if the relevant common beliefs include those pertaining to the 13th Imam, 
then that  demographic does become important.  Hence, the relevant cultural group for a study 
will depend on the cultural domain, that is, the kind and topic of knowledge of interest.  
Sunni Jihadist Cultural Model
Consider a Sunni Muslim extremist conception of socio-political relationships between Islam 
and the West. A mental model of such relationships contains an individual person’s concepts as 
well as their understanding of the causal relationships between concepts, i.e. the antecedents and 
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	  	  	  	  	  Volume	  2,	  Issue	  1	  	  	  
7	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   June	  	  2011
consequences of political activities and their outcomes. This mental model influences the 
individual’s expectations for how socio-political relationships will unfold and provides a 
framework for selecting behaviours and goals within this context.  Figure 1 provides a network 
representation that might describe a Sunni Muslim’s mental model of current political events. 
The set of ideas represented in Figure 1 were extracted from articles that describe jihadist 
narratives, and is presented here for illustrative purposes[14] ,[15] Figure 1 depicts a number of 
ideas using circles, lines, and colour. These ideas include simple concepts such as “Western 
arrogance” and “Muslim honour” represented as circles.  It also includes causal ideas, such as 
that development of a new Islamic caliphate would decrease the extent of Western dominance 
and bring about a return of past  Islamic glory.  These are represented as lines in the figure, with 
+/- indicating the direction of the causal belief.  Finally, Figure 1 portrays ideas of desired states 
or value using colour, as well as a logical flow across desired states.  Developing an Islamic 
caliphate is a good thing.  Maintaining (and enhancing) Muslim honour is likewise valued. 
 
Figure 1.  Sunni jihadist cultural model of political relationships
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According to the model, jihad is viewed positively and should be supported by the model’s 
adherents due to the perceived anticipated consequences for Muslims.  Most directly, support for 
jihad decreases the chances that the West  will continue its war against Islam, and enhances 
collective Muslim honour.  Holding the beliefs described by  this mental model is likely  to have 
fairly strong consequences for how a person will decide and act in a number of specific, relevant 
situations.
As implied by the name, mental models reside inside the heads of individuals.  However, when 
people communicate with each other in any variety of modes, they develop mental models that 
may  begin to resemble one another.  Mental models can spread widely throughout a population, 
becoming ‘cultural’ in the sense of being shared by many of its members.  A cultural model 
refers to an external representation of a set of culturally-shared mental models that is constructed 
by a researcher.  A cultural model represents a consensus of the mental models for a particular 
cultural group and domain.  Hence, for the Sunni Muslims who hold beliefs similar to the 
elements in this model, Figure 1 serves as one of their cultural models in the domain of socio-
political relationships.
Considering Figure 1 as a cultural model gives us a precise way of identifying cultural 
transmission and cultural change [16].  For example, suppose the prospect of return to a glorious 
Islamic civilisation is the most salient perceived outcome that is positively influenced by the 
concept of supporting jihad.  A change in the causal belief chain so that jihad in the present 
situation is seen instead as decreasing the chances of a glorious Islamic revival could affect a 
change in the value (or attitude) associated with acts that support jihad.  That is, we might 
observe a change in the overall cultural model resulting from this shift in the specific causal 
chain of beliefs that link jihad to Islamic glory.  Such an attitude change might then result in a re-
examination and reinterpretation of Islamic texts, or at  least the salience of such messages.  This 
example highlights the interrelation between causal beliefs and values, in addition to illustrating 
how cultural models can represent cultural transmission.
Cultural Values, Models and Domains
Cultural psychologists have often conceptualised culture in terms of lists of domain-general, 
stable traits, such as individualist-collectivist  value orientations [17].  Researchers operating 
within this programme aim to find a core set of dimensions for characterising cultures that they 
believe to be important across a wide variety of domains.  The idea is to provide purely 
analytical predictions, a priori, about cultural groups that are widely applicable to many 
particular problems.  For example, cultural researchers from this perspective might attempt to 
understand popular support for jihad in Middle Eastern countries by  considering the general level 
of disparity of power held by  members of those societies.  An important assumption about 
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culturally-shared mental models, in contrast, is that they  are highly specific to particular domains 
[18]. That is, activities such as participation in a rally for Hezbollah are supported by  mental 
models that are tailored to those specific activities. Hence the culturally-shared mental models 
comprise values, beliefs, and concepts that are salient to members of a particular culture in 
particular contexts, and may  well not generalise to other situations. Multiple cultural values are 
reflected in people’s mental models, and certain values may be more important  than others 
depending upon the situation, a phenomenon sometimes known as value trumping [19]. For 
example, Americans typically place a high value on freedom of speech; however, they may also 
support censorship or restricted access to information at certain times (e.g., extremely  violent or 
sexually-explicit  content). Hence, from the cultural models perspective it  is difficult  to 
understand the cultural considerations that are relevant within a particular context by starting 
with pre-existing lists of “domain general” cultural values.  This suggests that it is preferable to 
begin cultural analysis of a new domain in a more exploratory fashion, allowing values to 
emerge from the analysis along with their related cultural concepts and causal beliefs [20].
Mental models are naturally  domain specific because they are explanations of the workings of 
particular artefacts and natural processes. Furthermore, mental models can vary  across cultures in 
ways that are constrained only by the domain itself and any cognitive universals that ground 
shared understanding across humanity  [21].  Most work on mental models has focused on the 
physical domain, though people also possess mental models that pertain to the psychological and 
social domains, as exemplified in Figure 1 [22].  A cultural model represents a consensus of 
mental models within the context of a particular domain.  
One specific approach to cultural modelling begins by  identifying the judgements or decisions of 
primary interest for study, such as a decision to engage in suicide terrorism. The decisions chosen 
arise in specific contexts as defined by critical incidents or scenarios. They are made by members 
of the cultural group being investigated, typically in a way that is surprising or confusing to 
members outside the group. Once the key  decisions are identified, investigators build models of 
the cultural ideas that directly  influence those decisions. This approach, called “cultural network 
analysis” ensures that the aspects of culture investigated are relevant to the decisions of interest.  
Cultural Network Analysis
Cultural network analysis is a method for describing ideas that are shared by members of cultural 
groups, and relevant to decisions within a defined situation [23]. CNA discriminates between 
three kinds of ideas: concepts, values, and beliefs about causal relations. The cultural models 
resulting from CNA use network diagrams to show how all the ideas relate to one another. The 
CNA approach also includes the full set of techniques needed to build cultural model diagrams. 
This consists of specific methods to elicit the three kinds of ideas from people in interviews or 
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survey instruments, extract the ideas from interview transcripts or other texts, analyse how 
common the ideas are between and within cultural groups, and align and assemble the common 
ideas into complete maps. CNA shares aspects with other approaches to cultural analysis, 
especially cognitive approaches developed by anthropologists [24].  However, it  offers some 
specific aspects as a complete method that distinguishes it  from other ways of examining 
cultures.  These aspects include an emphasis on ensuring relevance of cultural models to key 
decisions to provide a more direct link to actual behaviour, portrayal of the cultural insider or 
‘emic’ perspective, modelling interrelated networks of ideas rather than treating ideas as 
independent entities, and by seeking to directly estimate the actual prevalence of ideas in the 
network rather than relying on more vague notions of sharedness.
Cultural Network Analysis comprises an exploratory phase and a confirmatory  phase.  In the 
exploratory phase, concepts and mental models are extracted from qualitative sources, such as 
interviews and open source media (web news, blogs, email), with little presupposition regarding 
the elicited contents. One goal of this phase is to develop an initial understanding of the concepts 
and characteristics that are culturally relevant within the domain.  A second objective is to obtain 
initial graphical representations of people’s mental models in forms that closely match their own 
natural representational structure.  Qualitative analysis and representation at this stage yield 
insights that can be captured in initial cultural models.  Often, qualitative analysis may be all that 
is needed for applications.  The exploratory  phase also generates a wealth of material for 
constructing subsequent structured data collection in a confirmatory phase.  In the confirmatory 
phase of CNA, structured interviews, field experiments, and automated semantic mining of web-
based sources are used to obtain systematic data that is more amenable to statistical analysis. 
Statistical models used by  cognitive anthropologists and market  researchers are employed to 
assess the patterns of agreement and derive statistics describing the distribution of concepts, 
causal beliefs, and values.  Finally, formal representations of the cultural models are constructed 
that illustrate the statistical and qualitative information in diagrams.  Influence diagrams are an 
important representation format for cultural models, as illustrated in Figure 1.  Formal 
representation makes it possible to use cultural models in a variety of applied contexts.
Cultural Models and Terrorist Cognition
Cultural modelling and the epidemiological view of culture can help to further understand the 
shared cognition of terrorists and their audiences.  From the epidemiological view, culture is 
made up of contagious ideas, that is, ideas that propagate effectively  within a population [25]. 
Two broad objectives of research from this cultural epidemiology  viewpoint are to characterise 
the current distribution of mental models within cultural groups, and to understand the dynamics 
of culture.
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Fundamental cultural research programs from this perspective seek to address why  some ideas 
are more infectious than others, and to explain the most widely distributed and long-lasting ideas 
within a population.  Research for practical purposes has a slightly different focus.  From a 
decision-making standpoint, for example, we recognise that many ideas may be pervasive but 
inconsequential to decisions of practical interest [26].  Hence, a decision-centred approach to 
culture and cognition begins with critical judgements and decisions that are made by members of 
a cultural group.  For example, we conceive of the decision to accept the terrorist group’s 
worldview as the central node within the highest-level of a hierarchy  of terrorist cultural models. 
Using Cultural Network Analysis, we can study the networks of causally-interconnected ideas 
that are relevant to those decisions in order to answer a host of questions, such as:
1. What is the distribution of mental models shared among particular terrorist groups and 
their potential supporters?
2. How did the distribution get to be that way?
3. How stable are those distributions?
4. In what ways are the distributions changing over time?
5. How do individual ideas influence one another in these cultural belief networks?
Resulting cultural models and descriptions of their dynamics from such studies can provide 
considerable insight into the thinking behind communications that stem from terrorist groups. 
They  also provide a basis for developing effective counter-communications by aiding in the 
determination of what makes for culturally meaningful messages. Cultural models would allow 
for making predictions concerning the effectiveness of a message by providing the opportunity  to 
assess potential unintended inferences that individuals with a certain knowledge structure might 
make.  Specifically, in a cultural models diagram, each concept and causal belief represents an 
opportunity to effect a change in beliefs or concepts.  Hence, such diagrams can provide an 
orderly  basis for determining the content of communications.  Messages are created so as to 
affect the values of the most vulnerable concept nodes (i.e., those for which there is the least 
consensus) which then propagate across perceived influences to affect the values of other 
concepts.  These effects spread through the cultural belief network, ultimately changing the value 
in overall perceptions or cognitions.  With this CNA approach, information efforts focus on 
transmitting the most relevant information to effect conceptual change in a way that makes sense 
within the cultural group’s understanding.
If the cultural group’s understanding is mapped out in this way using their culturally  relevant 
concepts and causal beliefs, then it can be relatively straightforward to identify critical concepts 
for targeting messages.  Pursuing this strategy requires the following steps:
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• create a cultural model relevant to the action or belief of interest;
• obtain relevant quantitative estimates of parameters in the model;
• simulate the cultural change effects of changes to detail-level concept values;
• identify the most vulnerable concepts and concept values as those for which the 
most disagreement exists;
• compose messages to affect the values of those concepts.
In sum, the results of CAN studies can provide valuable input to the development of accurate 
models of terrorist decision making, as well as for the cognitive characterisation of groups based 
on their ideological commitments.  A critical aspect of establishing an environment unfavourable 
to extremist ideas is to begin to take apart  the rhetoric of terror-sponsoring organisations, and 
address their ideologies through communication [27]. In doing this, we may find ways to remove 
the appeal of religious-inspired myths of terrorist acts as the glorious correction of moral 
wrongdoing [28]. 
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Abstract
Numerous political analysts have argued that conflicts over sacred land are intractable. These 
scholars maintain that sacred lands are psychologically  perceived as indivisible, or alternatively, 
in the sociological tradition, their indivisibility is a social fact. Moreover, religious beliefs are 
viewed as stagnant and resistant to change. Consequently, resolving such conflicts is fraught with 
difficulty, and even if a truce could be imposed, it  would be unstable and violence would 
eventually erupt. A cognitive and evolutionary account offers a less pessimistic view. Individuals 
do not conceive of sacred lands in the same way that they conceive of sacred space, such as 
cemeteries or houses of worship, or sacred objects, such as holy water or prayer beads. Unlike 
sacred space and objects, whose boundaries are clearly defined, conceptions of sacred land are 
typically abstract and may  bear little resemblance to the contested physical land. While abstract 
notions of sacred land are indivisible and must remain intact, the physical land is not indivisible, 
and therefore there is often greater room for negotiation of sacred lands than is generally 
appreciated.
The map is not the territory.
Alfred Korzybski, 1931
Humans sacralise countless things, including water, wine, cows, dung, trees, books, buildings, 
and rocks.  The types of item that humans sacralise appear unbounded, but possibly the most 
recurrent thing that humans have sacralised throughout history is land. Some have even claimed 
that sacralising land is nearly universal among traditional peoples.[1] Despite its prevalence 
across time and space, there is a notable lack of research addressing why humans sacralise land. 
The importance and urgency of understanding why humans sacralise land are painfully obvious. 
Sacred lands are at the heart of numerous recent and current violent conflicts such as Israel
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−Palestine, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, and bin Laden’s campaign against  the United States.  Not all 
lands deemed sacred are involved in conflict, and many territorial disputes, in fact most, do not 
involve sacred lands.[2] But those conflicts which arise from disputed sacred territories have 
been particularly devastating and many of them, such as Israel−Palestine and Kashmir, have 
proven frustratingly difficult to resolve. 
It has been argued that sacred land and related territorial conflicts, such as ethnicity-based 
homeland conflicts,[3] are particularly  difficult to resolve because lands are viewed by disputants 
as indivisible. As Goddard describes, “So intractable are conflicts in Jerusalem, Kosovo, 
Kashmir, and Ulster that their indivisibility appears natural, an inevitable result of clashing 
identities and attachments to the land.”[4] If contested land is genuinely indivisible, such 
disputes are expected to escalate toward military conflict more quickly than other disputes and to 
be more difficult to peacefully  resolve.[5] Here I offer a more optimistic assessment of sacred-
land conflicts based on evolutionary and cognitive approaches to the study of religion. 
In a significant paper on the problem of indivisibility, Hassner describes two primary types of 
policy response to religious conflicts generally, and sacred land conflicts specifically.[6] The 
first, which we can refer to as the rational actor approach, assumes that political actors are 
rational and respond predictably to incentives. This approach “seeks to strip  conflicts of their 
symbolic pretences to expose underlying material interests.”[7] It assumes that sacred values can 
be negotiated like other resources; in other words, sacred land has a price and conflict resolution 
should concentrate on determining the price of land for disputant parties.  The second approach 
is less optimistic about any form of negotiation and is associated with the work of influential 
political theorist Samuel Huntington.[8] This “irrational religious actor” approach assumes that 
political involvement in sacred land disputes is hopeless, since religious forces are mysterious, 
capricious, and beyond the control of political influence.
Here I pursue a third approach, one that recognises religious behaviour as a product of cognitive 
mechanisms shaped by  our evolutionary history.[9] This approach considers sacralising land an 
evolved strategy that emerges because of the net benefits that accrue to individuals and groups 
who pursue it, relative to alternative behavioural strategies.[10] While sacralising land is highly 
visible and contentious in the contemporary world, sacralising land has a long history in the 
human lineage and is a strategy with deep evolutionary roots in our species. All terrestrial 
species, including humans, rely on land to furnish the resources necessary for survival and 
reproduction, and many species of course vigorously defend their territories. Human territorial 
conflicts, however, differ from non-human ones in important ways. As various authors have 
noted, the value humans ascribe to land is often unrelated to the value of its material resources, 
and, notably, wars are fought over lands with little inherent value, including deserts, 
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swamplands, and other barely  habitable environments.[11] In these conflicts, 'value' is often 
measured in intangible currencies, such as identity  and sacredness, rather than in material 
benefits. Only humans sacralise their territories; the goal of evolutionary analyses is to 
understand the selective pressures that have shaped this unique human strategy. 
The approach taken here is similar to the irrational actor approach in that it recognises that the 
behaviour of religious actors often deviates considerably from the predictions of rational choice 
models. To understand this discrepancy between behaviours and models, we must examine the 
underlying cognition that motivates behavioural decisions involving sacred things. Psychologists 
have shown that sacred values can outweigh the economic incentives that are at the heart of 
rational choice approaches.[12] Atran et al. urge researchers to study the role of sacred values in 
political conflicts, and scholars who have done so have opened up new avenues for conflict 
resolution.[13] For example, Ginges et al. have shown how symbolic concessions with little 
economic value, such as apologies, carry significant  weight among conflicting parties.[14] While 
evolutionary  and cognitive approaches to conflict resolution eschew rational choice models, in 
contrast to the irrational actor approach, they  do not maintain that religious actors are beyond the 
control of political forces. On the contrary, religious actors only appear capricious and 
mysterious because they are studied with models that fail to consider their genuine emotional 
attachments to religious and sacred values.[15]
There are various analytical strategies that evolutionary scholars have employed to understand 
political conflict, including ethology,[16] evolutionary psychology,[17] and evolutionary biology.
[18] A broad evolutionary analysis of why humans sacralise land, which can address fundamental 
questions such as the conditions under which such a strategy is adaptive, is beyond the scope of 
this article.[19] Rather, here I focus on the underlying cognitive foundations of sacralising land. 
Understanding the cognitive mechanisms that shape our conceptions of sacred land should 
enhance our ability to offer effective policy recommendations to resolve what are often viewed 
as intractable conflicts.  
Defining Sacred Land
Before examining the cognitive foundations of sacralising land it is necessary to define “sacred 
land.” According to Durkheim, “sacred things are things protected and isolated by prohibitions; 
profane things are those things to which the prohibitions are applied and that must keep at  a 
distance from what is sacred”.[20] For Durkheim, sacredness is a characteristic of something 
physical, a place or an object.  Alternatively, Rappaport defines sacredness as a characteristic of 
discourse, specifically discourse that is unverifiable and unfalsifiable.[21] Among adherents ‘the 
sacred’ is unquestionable. The distinction between the object of sacralisation[22] and the 
discourse that surrounds such an object  is important because sacred things are humanly 
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	  	  	  	  	  Volume	  2,	  Issue	  1	  	  	  
19	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   June	  	  2011
constructed. Humans must do something to make a material item sacred.  To the naïve but 
objective observer, sacred and profane water look the same, feel the same, taste the same, and of 
course have the same chemical constitution. And even once a ritual act confers sacred status on 
an item such as water, it is only  via discourse that we can express the changed and special status 
of the object.  Thus, here I draw from both Durkheim and Rapapport’s definitions and define 
sacred as that which is distinguished from profane things and associated with unverifiable and 
unfalsifiable discourse.
Land is physical geographic terrain. Sacred land refers to land which is distinguished from 
profane land and is associated with unverifiable and unfalsifiable discourse. Sacred land is not 
just land that is special; in some way the land is connected to supernatural agents – either it is the 
home of ancestral spirits, given by a supernatural agent, created first by a supernatural agent, or 
it is a gateway to a supernatural realm – all of which are unverifiable. Also, sacred lands often 
have counterintuitive and/or counterfactual attributes. For example, many myths recount a 
glorious past in which the sacred land was home to extraordinary prey or produce, claims which 
are also generally unverifiable.[23] 
One intentional consequence of this definition is that sacred land is not limited to the domain of 
religion, however one might define religion.[24] The environmental movement’s appeal to the 
sacred status of land is the most obvious example,[25] but others exist  as well. For instance, the 
accounts of the early Israeli kibbutznik farmers all describe the mystical relationship they 
maintained with the land, despite being passionate rationalists and secularists.[26] And, notably, 
one of the most common ways to sacralise land, to recall ancient connections to land beyond the 
verifiable reach of history, is employed by  religious and secular groups alike. Toft, for example, 
describes homelands as an indivisible attribute of group identity and offers various examples of 
ethnic groups whose ancestral connections to lands are unverifiable, but deeply internalised.[27] 
It is also worth emphasising that sacredness is not a dichotomous status that can be ascribed to 
land; sacred lands must be considered along a continuum in which at one end are lands that are 
highly  sacralised, and on the other end are lands that are not sacralised at all.  Moreover, because 
the sacredness of land is always humanly constructed (i.e., it  is not inherent in the land), the 
sanctity of a land must always be defined relative to a particular population.
Intractability of Sacred Land Disputes
Walter observes that  the “most intractable civil wars in the last half of the twentieth century…
were those fought over territory.”[28] And there is a widespread assumption among scholars and 
policy makers, regardless of their approach, that among territorial conflicts those involving 
sacred lands are the most intractable. Hassner argues that “[c]ontingent processes create 
competition over sacred space[29] that, combined with the problem of indivisibility, create 
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conflict over sacred space that cannot be resolved by negotiation or compromise.”[30] The 
intractability of sacred land disputes is invariably  characterised as the consequence of two 
factors: the inflexibility of religion and the indivisibility of sacred land. 
If one listens to the rhetoric of sacred land conflicts, it is easy to understand why scholars have 
taken a desperate view of these disputes. Statements such as “Jerusalem shall remain eternally 
united” and “Can we change God’s will?” do not seem to leave much room for negotiation. 
Nonetheless, there is considerable room for optimism. Here I argue that sacred lands are not 
indivisible. I maintain that one reason that sacred lands have been incorrectly perceived by 
scholars to be indivisible is that they  have been conflated with other sacred things, particularly 
sacred space and sacred objects, which are indeed generally indivisible. A closer examination of 
how we cognitively understand and behaviourally  relate to sacred land reveals that it is more 
divisible than other sacred things.  I support the argument developed here using examples from 
various sacralised lands, but I rely  primarily  on my own ethnographic fieldwork and experiences 
in Israel.[31] Sacred land conflicts are the result of multiple complex factors. The cognitive 
approach offered here is not a panacea for these challenging conflicts, however, it is hoped that 
this perspective can open new and productive avenues for negotiation.   
Inflexibility of Religion
As mentioned above, one of the primary  stumbling blocks in conflict resolution over sacred 
lands is the characterisation of religion (and religious actors) as inflexible. This is simply 
incorrect. Often, religious sanctity  is conceived by insiders and outsiders to be permanent and 
eternal. Pioneering scholars of religion, such as Durkheim, repeatedly asserted that “there is 
something eternal in religion”[32] and modern commentators have made similar claims.[33] In 
describing the sacralisation of space, Hassner states, “Once a religious presence, a hierophany, 
has been identified in a place, it grants the place permanent sanctity.”[34] But religions are not 
eternal and sanctity is not permanent; religions are flexible, malleable, and often respond 
adaptively to changing environmental conditions, and Hassner is fully  aware of this. For 
example, in other work Hassner (2006) carefully describes how mosques in Iraq were targeted 
and recklessly destroyed when U.S. troops were inside, suggesting a temporary suspension of 
their sanctity. [35] Also, during the first Gulf War, despite laws preventing Jews from entering 
Saudi Arabia because their presence would defile the sacred land, Jewish-American soldiers 
were reluctantly  permitted to enter Saudi Arabia. To replace their Jewish dog tags, Jewish 
soldiers were given dog tags labelled “Protestant B”.[36] Pragmatism trumped sacred values. 
And, since 1972, successive Israeli governments have consistently proclaimed Gaza as eternally 
united with Israel;[37] nonetheless, governance was transferred to the PLO in 1993, and in 2005 
Israeli settlements were dismantled and the remaining settlers relocated to Israel. 
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Religion is not inflexible and the sacred status of lands is clearly not eternal. But why does 
religion appear to be resistant to change? One of the remarkable features of religion is its ability 
to adapt to local environmental conditions while adherents experience partaking in an eternally 
consistent and changeless tradition. Rappaport argues that  religion achieves this through a 
hierarchy of religious discourse.[38] He claims there is an inverse relationship between the 
material specificity  of a religious claim and the durability  of the claim. Religious ideas are 
hierarchically organised within communities and at the apex of a community’s conceptual 
hierarchy is what Rappaport refers to as ultimate sacred postulates, such as the Shahada, Shema, 
or Vandana Ti-sarana for Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist communities respectively. These 
ultimate sacred postulates lack material specificity and are highly resistant  to change. However, 
below ultimate sacred postulates in the religious hierarchy are various cosmological axioms, 
ritual proscriptions, commandments, directives, social rules and other religious assertions that do 
experience varying levels of change, depending on their material specificity. 
The religious norms and practices change all the time but it is understood by those who 
experience it as an intensification of acceptance.[39] Religions rarely invalidate the old 
completely; change occurs by adding to previous practices and beliefs and elaborating upon 
them, while other beliefs and practices slip  away  unnoticed. Once sacralisation is internalised, it 
is indeed very difficult to convince adherents that something consecrated is no longer holy. 
Hence, when undergoing change, religions often retain the most sacralised elements and augment 
them.  Missionaries often retain the dates of pagan celebrations, Jewish prayers appear in the 
Catholic Mass, and in Micronesia, where I’ve conducted fieldwork, they have held onto their 
pantheon of gods and ancestral spirits by incorporating them into the Biblical myths that are now 
prominent in their lives.
Two other misconceptions about the inflexibility of religion are worth mentioning. First, 
religious communities, even fundamentalist communities, are not homogeneous in their beliefs. 
In interviews I’ve conducted amongst Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, some have confided that they 
are agnostics or atheists, but  they  remain in their communities despite their lack of belief because 
they  view the Ultra-Orthodox way of life positively, or at least better than the alternatives. Other 
researchers have reported similar experiences. [40] Goody  has shown that doubt is widespread in 
world and indigenous religions and he argues that doubt  is an inherent part of religious belief.
[41] Theologians have made similar claims.[42] Second, outsiders expect religious actors who 
have articulated and ritually  displayed their priorities − typically  implying that their religious 
commitments are their ultimate concern − to behave in ways that directly  reflect this ordering of 
priorities. Religious cognition, however, appears to be strongly encapsulated, preventing most 
religious actors from pursuing fitness-destroying behaviours.[43] Thus, while many  may express 
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extreme commitments to their sacred land, even martyrdom, the actions of most who articulate 
such views do not match the enthusiasm of their rhetoric.
To summarise, viewing religion as inflexible is not only inaccurate, but it impedes productive 
conflict resolution.[44] Religions are complex adaptive systems that respond effectively to 
changing socioeconomic and ecological conditions.[45] One of religion’s vital adaptive features 
is its ability  to appear timeless and unchanging to adherents, yet be responsive to varying 
circumstances.[46] Religions achieve this sleight of hand by retaining core religious elements 
while readjusting social rules to accommodate new realities. Change for adherents is not 
experienced as something radically new; it is experienced as increased acceptance of eternal 
truths that have always been part of their religious tradition.
Indivisibility of Sacred Land
The primary reason that  sacred land disputes are characterised as intractable is that sacred lands 
are assumed to be indivisible. Scholars have taken two approaches to conceiving the problem of 
indivisibility, one sociological and the other psychological. The sociological position sees 
indivisibility as a social fact. As Goddard describes, “Indivisibility is a construction; it is neither 
an objective, “inherent” property  of territory, nor subjective and reducible to individual 
consciousness.”[47] On the other hand, the psychological approach focuses on the subjective 
perceptions of individuals; the indivisibility of a territory is an internalised belief. As Hassner 
describes, “beliefs constitute the identity  of agents and create the structural constraints within 
which they act.” [48]
To generalise, social constructivists such as Goddard have been more optimistic about the 
resolution of sacred land conflicts than those who take a psychological approach to the problem, 
such as Hassner.  Constructivists recognise that  all sacred things are humanly constructed, and 
some have argued that if humans can construct it, they can deconstruct it as well. This position 
has been attacked for various reasons;[49] most importantly, this position fails to appreciate the 
synergistic effects of human sacralisation. Sacralisation results in emergent properties; sacralised 
lands are not simply puzzles that can be put together and then taken apart. Naïve constructivists 
have also been attacked for not taking people’s beliefs about the indivisibility of land seriously 
enough. Toft has argued that there is little difference between something which is naturally 
indivisible (King Solomon’s baby  is the classic example) and something which is socially 
constructed to be indivisible, such as land: 
 Unless one can support the claim that constructed realities are relatively easy to alter, 
 there is, in short, no good reason to suppose an operational or causal difference between 
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 issues that are naturally  divisible and those whose indivisibility  is the product of human 
 social construction.[50]
The analysis I offer here is based on the psychological approach, but I maintain the optimism of 
the sociological constructivists. While various scholars, such as Hassner and Toft, have asserted 
that beliefs and perceptions of sacred lands need to be taken seriously, there has been little 
research investigating the underlying psychology that produces sacred land beliefs. The analysis 
below aims to initiate this important area of study. Constructed realities are not easy to alter, but I 
argue that the way in which sacred lands are cognitively  understood makes them easier to alter 
than other sacred items, and consequently easier to divide than formerly appreciated.
Comparing Sacred Land, Space, and Objects
One of the primary reasons that policy makers and scholars alike have claimed that sacred lands 
are indivisible is that they  have implicitly  assumed that  sacred lands are like other sacred things, 
particularly sacred space and objects, many of which are indeed indivisible. To develop this 
argument more fully, I compare sacred land to sacred space and sacred objects across three 
dimensions: physical qualities, internalisation mechanisms, and cultural conceptions. This 
comparative analysis will highlight the unique features of sacred land, many of which suggest 
that sacred lands are more divisible than previously  recognised.  The discussion is summarised in 
Table 1.
I have defined ‘sacred’ and ‘sacred land’ above, but it  is important to define sacred space and 
objects as well. Objects are physical things and sacred objects include items such as phylacteries, 
prayer beads, and holy  books, but also tables, forks, instruments, animals and their products, and 
countless other objects that humans sacralise and treat differently  than profane objects. Sacred 
spaces consist of humanly defined areas in which particular behaviours, typically ritual, are 
expected. [51] It is a place which “focuses attention on the forms, objects, and actions in it and 
reveals them as bearers of religious meaning.”[52] Sacred spaces include houses of worship, 
ritual baths, and cemeteries. There are often many sacred spaces (Via Dolorosa, Temple Mount/
Haram al-Sharif, al Aqsa Mosque) within a sacred land (Jerusalem).[53] And sacred spaces also 
occur within lands that are not sacralised (e.g., the sanctuary of any church in Newark, New 
Jersey).  Sacred space and land are occasionally lumped into one category (intentionally and 
unintentionally), but, as will become apparent below, there are good reasons to keep them 
separate.[54]
Physical Qualities
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	  	  	  	  	  Volume	  2,	  Issue	  1	  	  	  
24	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   June	  	  2011
I begin by comparing sacred land, space, and objects along three dimensions of physical quality: 
construction, permanence, and size. The differences that I highlight are obvious, but I point them 
out because they all contribute to the distinctiveness of how we cognitively process land.
Construction: One of the fundamental characteristics of sacred space is that it  is humanly 
constructed. Temples are erected, shrines are built, and cemeteries are dug. Even when using part 
of the natural landscape as sacred space, such as turning a cave into a house of worship or using 
natural springs as a ritual bath, humans rarely leave the site unmodified; humans construct 
markers and gates to help define an area as sacred and facilitate ritual activities. 
How sacred objects are constructed varies widely. Most sacred objects, such as chalices, beads, 
and scrolls, are of course humanly  constructed. There may  be a few exceptions, such as crystals, 
but even these objects are often shaped by  humans to distinguish them from profane objects. In 
contrast to sacred space and objects, sacred lands are not humanly  constructed. They are of 
course mentally  constructed (see below), but no human construction is required to make or 
define the land as sacred. Sacred lands are typically  designated as sacred by supernatural agents, 
without human assistance. Supernatural agents primarily  act within a religious context, but even 
in secular contexts agents such as Mother Nature or Gaia can bestow sacredness upon land.  
Permanence:   Sacred spaces can be bulldozed, foreclosed, incinerated, washed away in a flood, 
and in countless other ways simply destroyed. Demographic changes can also transform sacred 
spaces. For example, as American Jews left their urban dwellings for the suburbs, their 
synagogues were converted into restaurants, department stores, and concert venues. Sacred 
objects of course can also be crushed, burnt, torn, and physically  destroyed. Sacred lands, 
however, cannot be physically  destroyed. A fire may raze the land and consequently change the 
landscape, or a nuclear bomb may  eliminate the population, but the sacred land would remain, 
however altered it  may be. The perceived permanence of land is a cognitively odd feature and 
likely makes land receptive to supernatural conceptions and notions of eternity.
Size: Sacred lands are larger than sacred spaces and objects. Even grand sacred spaces, such as 
the Taj Mahal, are considerably smaller than even the smallest sacred lands. It is rare that sacred 
lands can be seen by one individual in their entirety at once. With the advent of aviation and 
space travel, lands no longer seem as immense as they once must have. Nonetheless, the massive 
size of land, beyond one’s own eyesight, probably elicited a sense of awe that made land 
historically receptive to supernatural conceptions and associations.
Internalisation Mechanisms
Sacred things are not inherently sacred; they must be transformed from mundane to sacred 
things. Belief that things are sacred must be internalised and culturally  shared, and indeed 
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religions employ various internalisation strategies to ensure that adherents cognitively and 
emotionally distinguish the sacred from the profane. Here I examine four primary  mechanisms of 
internalising the sacred: symbol, myth, discourse, and ritual. I do not explore the dynamics of 
each of these internalisation strategies,[55] but rather focus on the differences in how these 
strategies are employed to internalise the sacred status of objects, space, and land. 
Symbolisation: Symbols are commonly employed when the significata, that which is being 
signified, is abstract and needs to be physically  or cognitively represented. Symbols are effective 
in reducing the sizes of things which are difficult to observe in their entirety, or impossible to 
manipulate. Symbols can also connect the present to the past.[56] Physical symbols, such as 
flags and crosses, can become sacred objects themselves. 
Land is highly symbolised, either due to its abstract nature, a point we will return to below, or 
simply  because of its size. Land is most commonly symbolised through flags, but iconic symbols 
such as maps can transform mundane items into charged political objects as well. Otherwise, 
identical maps alternately  labelled Israel or Palestine, depending on the consumer market, appear 
on T-shirts, key chains, place mats and other items throughout the Middle East.  The intensity  of 
symbolisation and the sanctity of the symbolic objects are likely to be associated with the 
sacredness of the land symbolically represented. 
Sacred space and sacred objects are not commonly symbolised, or at least less so than sacred 
land. If one wishes to evoke a connection to phylacteries, there is no need to develop a symbol as 
the object itself can serve the same purpose. Symbols that are employed to represent sacred 
spaces tend to be iconic, such as the pictures of the Kaaba or Kotel that adorn the walls of 
Muslim and Jewish homes respectively. Symbols of sacred space tend to be reserved for the most 
sacred spaces within a community; the local church is rarely the object of intense symbolisation. 
The power of symbols is that among the initiated they can evoke potent emotions[57] and this 
aspect of symbols is vital for internalising the sacredness of land. When living in sacred lands, 
one is often too mired in the mundane for the land to directly  evoke feelings of commitment, thus 
symbols become powerful tools for internalising commitments to the land. Entering sacred space 
is usually sufficient to evoke such emotions, thus symbolic representations of sacred space are 
only needed when access to particular sacred spaces are limited. 
Myth: The sacredness of things is also internalised through myth. Myths provide reasons and 
rationalisations for why items are sacred, and a history, even if not entirely  factual, connecting 
sacred items to ancestors. Similarly to symbols, myths help  internalise the sacredness of things 
by evoking emotions, but they additionally tap into our apparent need for narratives. [58] Sacred 
lands are always surrounded by myth, and in traditional populations myth is often the primary 
mechanism used to internalise the sanctity  of the land. The importance of myth in internalising 
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sacred-land beliefs suggests that sacred lands generally demand justification.  Myths invariably 
assert a population’s priority to the land, through their ancestors, and ‘earliest’ residence is a 
compelling justification for land ownership across cultures. Interestingly, there is emerging 
evidence of a cognitive 'first owner bias' in human children and adults; we assume that 
individuals who first possess an item are the true owners of the item.[59] Others have argued that 
the well-documented human tendency to place greater value on things one might lose than one 
might gain, known as the endowment effect, may help to account for the origins of private 
property, including human territoriality.[60] If a culture asserts that their ancestors originally 
possessed a territory, psychological biases such as the endowment effect may make such beliefs 
particularly potent. [61] In addition to ancestral connections to the land, myths often place lands 
at the centre of the universe, recount how a supernatural agent gave the land to the people, or 
suggest that it was the first land created, elevating its status. Myths provide unfalsifiable 
connections to the land. 
In Judaism, the land of Israel is believed to be “more sanctified than any  other land” (Mishnah 
Kelim 1:6) and plays a central role in its foundational myths. God promises the land of Israel to 
Abraham, and a later ancestor, Moses, brings the people to the edge of the land. The foundational 
myths are genuinely internalised and used to assert political positions. During fieldwork among 
religious Jews in Israel, I would often hear, “We have no right to give the land back; it is God’s 
and He gave it to us.”[62]
There are countless authoritative myths outside of the Torah, developed by the Rabbis in what is 
known as Midrashic literature. One popular Midrash claims that Israel is the gateway to heaven.
Another Midrash places Israel at the centre of the world: “Just as the navel is found at the centre 
of human beings, so the land of Israel is found at the centre of the world…” (Midrash Tanchuma, 
Kedoshim 10). Other Midrashim (pl. of Midrash) describe that the land of Israel possesses 
extraordinary  qualities such as producing enormous produce, including peaches that  fill the 
stomachs of six men. 
Myth typically connects a people to a land historically, but the Midrashic literature also connects 
Jews to the land in the future. Midrashim relate that in the time of the Messiah all Jews will 
return to Israel. These Midrashim are not mere stories – they are genuinely internalised. For 
example, there are apartments in Israel, owned by American Jews, in which the rental leases 
stipulate that should the Messiah arrive the renters would have to vacate the apartments because 
the owners would be moving to Israel.  
Sacred objects and space also evoke myths, but cross-culturally there appears to be much greater 
variance in the number of myths related to objects and space than sacred land. It is likely that the 
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intensity of myth development will be a function of how contested an item is. Contested sacred 
spaces, such as the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, have generated abundant myths as each side 
aims to give its people a narrative basis for ownership claims. Less contested spaces and objects 
are likely to develop far fewer myths. 
Discourse: Sacred things are also sacralised through discourse. There is some sanctified 
discourse which surrounds very special sacred places and objects, but it is minor compared to 
that which occurs about sacred lands, which often evoke numerous expressive poems and songs. 
Contemporary cultures also internalise the holiness of land through sanctified expressions. In 
Israel, for example, “If I forget thee Jerusalem, let my right hand wither” (Psalm 137) is a well 
known expression, and it surfaces repeatedly in art and song.  Colloquial discourse in Israel also 
internalises Israelis’ connection to their sacred land. While the Torah and liturgy generally  refer 
to ‘Israel’ as Eretz Yisrael, the land of Israel, in Modern Hebrew ‘Israel’ is simply referred to as 
HaAretz, the land. 
Rituals: Rituals are often employed to internalise the sacred status of land. Rituals in indigenous 
societies not only reinforce the sacred status of land, but they are also used to demarcate 
territories.[63] In Islam, Hinduism, Christianity and other world religions, pilgrimage rituals 
connect dispersed communities to sacred lands.[64] In Judaism, worship historically revolved 
around three pilgrimage holidays – Pesach, Shavuoth, and Sukkot – on which Jews were 
expected to travel to Jerusalem with their sacrifices to be offered at the Temple. While these 
holidays are no longer celebrated as pilgrimages, worship and other rituals play  a significant role 
in how Jews interact with the land of Israel. Wherever they are, Jews face Jerusalem during 
prayer, and Jerusalem and the land of Israel are mentioned more than 100 times in the daily 
liturgy. And the land of Israel is distinguished from diaspora lands through numerous agricultural 
laws, such as the harvest sabbatical known as shmittah, that apply only within the land of Israel. 
Modern Israelis have also instituted or re-established holidays to connect them to the land. For 
example, Tu B’shevat, the celebration of the trees which was historically a minor holiday 
primarily  observed among small groups of Kabbalists, has witnessed a rebirth in modern Israel in 
which even secular Israelis customarily plant a tree in honour of the day. And new holidays have 
been established, such as Yom Yerushaliyim (Jerusalem Day), celebrating the reunification of 
Jerusalem after the Six Day War in 1967. In 2000, ceremonies and festivities commemorated 
3000 years since King David conquered the city.
While pilgrimages and memorial ceremonies play  a significant role in sacralising many lands, 
not all sacred lands are pilgrimage sites, and in some sacred lands rituals play  only a minimal 
role in internalising the sacredness of the land. In contrast to this variance, ritual is vital for 
internalising the sacredness of sacred objects and space. Ritual does not merely identify sacred 
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objects and space; it  creates them. Holy water, for example, is not simply water that has been 
discovered to be holy, or water that has been rationally demonstrated to have special qualities. It 
is, rather, water that has been transformed through ritual.[65] Ritual is the primary method of 
internalising the sacred status of sacred objects and space. Ritual is the means through which we 
interact with sacred objects, and it guides our behaviour in sacred space. Thus, while ritual is 
sometimes important in reinforcing the sacred status of land, it is always vital in internalising the 
sacredness of space and objects.
The fact that ritual is not the primary internalisation method of sacralising land, as it probably  is 
with sacred space and objects, is fortunate when considering sacred-land conflict resolution. 
Rituals are simply more difficult to change than symbols, myths, and discourse. It  is remarkable 
how quickly humans will gravitate toward new group symbols, as social psychologists have 
repeatedly demonstrated.[66] Myths and discourse can also change rapidly. But rituals appear to 
be religion’s conservative mechanism. Consider the awkwardness experienced when confronting 
a new ritual. Rituals of course do change, but they  are more stable than religion’s other 
internalisation methods.
Cultural Conceptions
The final dimension this comparative analysis of sacred land, space, and objects focuses on is 
cultural conceptions of how individuals and groups construct and perceive sacred things.  It is 
within this last dimension, our cultural conceptions, that we find the most important differences 
between sacred land, space, and objects for understanding the divisibility of sacred land.
Desecration: Human effort, through ritual, sacralises things. Not surprisingly, human effort can 
also desacralise things. We can, for example, contaminate sacred objects, such as kosher dishes, 
by placing them in contact with profane items, such as non-kosher food. It is also clear that 
sacred spaces can be desecrated, such as when idols were brought into the Second Temple of 
Jerusalem.  The desecration of sacred land is less obvious. One traveller in 1901, for instance, 
describes Jerusalem as “The Holy City” despite observing that 
 Dung litters every corner, the offal of the shops is heaped in the midst of the streets. Filth 
 of every description is accumulated here for years.[67]
While the Torah does not explicitly discuss garbage in the Holy Land, the Torah seems to suggest 
that the land of Israel could be desecrated through the improper behaviour of its inhabitants 
(Leviticus 19:2).  However, the rabbis resisted such an interpretation. They viewed the purity of 
the land to be impervious to human whim. Indeed, the land was holy despite the profane 
behaviour of the Canaanites, and although the Israelites are harshly warned that they will be spit 
out from the land if they stray from the commandments, the land itself will remain sacred. In 
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contrast to sacred objects and space, defiled land does not have to be resacralised. Whereas 
human conceptions of sacred objects and space require human action to create, maintain, and re-
establish sanctity, the sanctity of land appears to come from elsewhere; most  typically  it is a 
status conferred by supernatural agents. 
Danger / Monitor Behaviour: The sacred is often defined as that which is forbidden and 
dangerous.[68] Accordingly, sacred things must be monitored to ensure appropriate behaviour, 
and there are consequences for improper behaviour. In many indigenous populations, objects 
touched by the chief possess a power (mana) and sacredness that can harm others.[69] And 
sacred space can be equally dangerous. For example, the Talmud (Yoma) describes the increasing 
risks involved, including death, as one moves closer to the Holy of Holies in the Jerusalem 
Temple. The kohen gadol (high priest), the only individual permitted to enter the Holy of Holies, 
is closely monitored to ensure his purity  prior to his entrance. Indeed, he is observed and 
prevented from sleeping on the evening before his entrance for fear of contamination through a 
nocturnal emission. Unlike sacred space and objects, sacred lands generally do not demand the 
ritual purity of inhabitants, nor is there intense monitoring of behaviour. 
Exclusivity: Sacred lands tend to be much less exclusive than sacred space and objects. There are 
many examples of certain classes of people, within and outside particular religions, that are 
forbidden to enter certain sacred areas, such as the Jerusalem Temple described above, the 
sanctuaries of Mormon churches (for non-members of The Church of Latter Day Saints), and 
women are excluded from men’s houses throughout Micronesia. Many sacred objects, including 
religious garb, food offerings, and ritual pipes, are similarly taboo for the uninitiated or impure. 
Sacred lands, however, rarely exclude entire classes of people.[70] It is likely that the necessity 
of material trade and exchange of knowledge has made the complete exclusion of outside groups 
on grounds of impurity rare across cultures. 
Boundaries: One reason that sacred lands are less exclusive than sacred spaces and objects is that 
their boundaries are more ambiguous. Hassner maintains that sacred spaces have unambiguous 
boundaries.[71] Indeed, sacred spaces tend to have humanly constructed and defined entrances 
and exits which demarcate boundaries. The boundaries of sacred objects are also clear (i.e., it is 
obvious where an object begins and ends). The boundaries of sacred lands, however, are far from 
certain. The boundaries of Jerusalem, for example, constantly change depending on the political 
winds, [72] and what constitute the Biblical borders of Israel are also open to interpretation. 
Sacred lands that consist of an explicit  environmental feature also have ambiguous boundaries. 
When approaching a sacred mountain or river, at  what point is one stepping on holy ground? 
Unless there is humanly  constructed demarcation, essentially turning the land into sacred space, 
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it is difficult to determine. Even the boundaries of sacred islands are unclear since the coastlines 
change daily with the tides and the coastal waters often maintain elements of holiness. 
Two anecdotes from my fieldwork in Tzfat, Israel, illustrate this point. First, religious Jews in 
Tzfat commonly remarked how the air in Israel is holy. Such conceptions of air, however, rarely 
consider geography. For instance, when I would ask if the air became holy when it crossed the 
Jordanian border, blank stares of confusion were the typical response.  Second, throughout the 
Second Intifada many interviewees claimed that Tzfat and the neighbouring town of Meron were 
protected from terrorist attacks because of the many holy people buried in both places. On 
August 4, 2002, a suicide bomber killed nine passengers on a bus at the Meron junction. When I 
returned to interviewees who had previously  mentioned the towns’ divine protection to ask them 
about the bombing, they invariably replied that the bombing was not within the historical (and 
thus protected) borders of Meron. In other words, interviewees did not eschew their belief in 
divine protection; rather, they simply altered the borders of Meron to fit the new reality.
Mundane activity: The sacred and profane must be separated. Consider Durkheim’s classic 
discussion of the sacred: 
 The mind experiences deep repugnance about the mingling, even simple contact, between 
 the corresponding things, because the notion of the sacred is always and everywhere 
 separate from the notion of the profane… The sacred thing is, par excellence, that which 
 the profane must not and cannot touch with impunity.[73]
This separation of the sacred and profane is carried out carefully in sacred space, where 
appropriate ritual activities dominate and inappropriate behaviours are shunned. And sacred 
objects are also carefully kept from profane and impure items, including shadows, carcasses, 
excrement, or simply unwashed hands. The separation of the sacred and profane is impossible, 
however, in sacred lands. Profane things exist in sacred lands (rats, garbage dumps, sewage, etc.) 
and to live in sacred land one must partake in mundane activities. The rabbis were well aware of 
this conflict for the land of Israel. They creatively circumvented it by transforming profane 
things into sacred things and profane behaviour into sacred behaviour. For example, consider the 
following statements from the Talmud and Midrash:
• All spittle found in Jerusalem is pure (Mishnah Shekalim 8:1).
• No fly was ever seen in the slaughterhouse [in Jerusalem] (Mishnah Avot 5:5).
• One who lives in the land of Israel leads a sinless life (Ketubot 110b-111a).
• Even the gossip of those who live in the land of Israel is Torah (Midrash Rabbah 34).
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These rabbinical claims attest to the tension between separating the sacred and profane within 
sacred lands. If people reside in sacred lands, mundane and profane activities within the lands are 
inevitable; the physical mixing of the sacred and profane makes sacred lands notably  different 
from sacred objects and space. Such contact with the profane would render sacred objects and 
space defiled. Sacred land, however, retains its sanctity because the sacred conception of the land 
is cognitively separated from the mundane conception of the lived-upon physical land. We now 
examine the cognitive separation of these conceptions more closely.
Abstraction: All of the above discussed cultural conceptions of sacred land (imperviousness to 
desecration, absence of behavioural monitoring, lack of exclusivity, ambiguous boundaries, and 
tolerance of mundane activities) all point to what I take to be the most important feature of 
sacred land with regard to conflict resolution: sacred lands have abstract qualities. What people 
conceptualise when they  consider or discuss sacred land is not the land itself, but rather an 
abstract idealised sacred concept of the land. For example, after major festivals, Jews proclaim 
“Next year in Jerusalem”, but they never say “Next year in West Jerusalem”, although this would 
surely be more accurate; since the Intifada, Jews rarely venture to East  Jerusalem. Regardless of 
this geographical discomfort, remarkably few get on a plane and spend next year in any part of 
Jerusalem. This is because when Jews mention Jerusalem, they are envisioning an abstract 
conception of Jerusalem, specifically, one expected during the time of the Messiah. As 
anthropologist Samuel Heilman describes, 
 Jerusalem: it is not one, but many. It is a place in which people actually live; it is a place 
 that lives in them. It is a figment of the imagination, an idea. It is visible, open to 
 discovery; it is unseen, hidden to all but insiders. It is constructed of mortar and stone and 
 inhabited by flesh and bone; it is formed of spirit  and faith and filled by  belief and 
 memory.[74] 
This is an extreme representation of the sacred/mundane distinction, but it  is useful. I am not 
denying that sacred land is real, I am simply pointing out that  those who sacralise land hold two 
conceptions of sacred land in their heads – one is indeed real, the other is an idealised 
abstraction. Jews are unlikely to ever proclaim “Next year in West Jerusalem” because when 
considering Jerusalem in a religious context they  are accessing their sacred abstract conception 
of Jerusalem, which is indeed indivisible. The physical Jerusalem, however, is already divided 
with separate elections and constrained social and economic interactions between the two halves 
of the city. [75] The distinction between the abstract conception of sacred land and the physical 
land itself is critical, because to resolve sacred land conflicts it  will be prudent to keep the 
abstract sacred land concept intact, even if the real land is divided.
Discussion and Conclusion
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The underlying theme of all the above comparisons is that sacred land conflicts are not 
intractable because sacred lands are not indivisible. The physical characteristics of sacred land – 
that it is not humanly constructed, maintains a sense of permanence, and is incomparable in size 
– make sacred land receptive to abstract, symbolic, and supernatural associations. These 
characteristics contribute to the dual perception of sacred land that humans maintain: one of a 
physical territory, the other of a sacred and symbolic land with supernatural associations. 
Moreover, the internalisation mechanisms employed to sacralise land – symbolisation, myth, and 
discourse – are more amenable to change than ritual, which is indeed challenging to change. 
Rituals often do play a role in the sacralisation of land, but rituals are a much more important 
internalisation mechanism for sacred objects and space. Most importantly, cultural constructions 
of land suggest that, unlike sacred space and objects, sacred land is divisible. Its immunity to 
desecration, the absence of ritual danger and behavioural monitoring, lack of out-group 
exclusivity, its ambiguous boundaries, tolerance of mundane activities, and dual conceptions – 
one idealised and one real – all suggest that land is not indivisible. 
As Eliade observes, there is an irony inherent in sacralising things: anything that manifests the 
sacred becomes something else, while at  the same time remaining itself.[76] This irony suggests 
that we cognitively encapsulate sacred things and keep them separate from the mundane. It 
obviously takes a fairly  complex psychology to cognitively juggle this paradox, but we seem to 
do it effortlessly. When holding sacralised wine, one fully understands that if the wine is dropped 
the glass will shatter, the wine will stain, and the mess will need to be cleaned up. It may be 
sacralised wine, but it  still maintains all of the typical features of mundane wine. This 
encapsulation of sacredness is also why nobody is existentially  troubled when they copulate, 
defecate, or engage in various other ‘profane’ activities within a sacred land. Indeed, it is likely 
that selection favoured an encapsulation of religious cognition to prevent it from encouraging 
behaviours that could have negative fitness consequences.[77]
In the above analysis I have largely relied on the Jewish relationship  to the land of Israel as a 
case study, but future work must explore whether the ethnographic data from other sacred lands 
support the arguments developed here. Subsequent analyses would benefit from comparisons 
between the internalisation methods of modern religions and indigenous religions. For example, 
indigenous populations tend to maintain a connection to their lands via their ancestors, ancestors 
with whom they are in regular communication. Contemporary world religions also assert that 
their ancestors once roamed their territory, but they are generally  not a source of direct worship; 
they  are more likely to be a source of inspiration rather than veneration. Moreover, world 
religions undoubtedly rely more on theological argument and justification for the sustained 
holiness of their land than indigenous populations. The doctrinal mode of world religions is also 
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more dependent on repetitive ritual than the imagistic mode of religion that characterises 
indigenous populations.[78] Reciting the name of a sacred land over 100 times a day, as 
observant Jews do, is unheard of in traditional populations. World religions symbolise their 
sacred lands to a much greater extent than indigenous religions do, presumably to rally  diaspora 
populations that do not reside within the sacred territory. Finally, there is less orthodoxy in 
indigenous populations, which may make it easier to settle territorial disputes among traditional 
populations. These differences between indigenous and world religions suggest that sacralising 
land in the modern context  may have stronger mechanisms of internalisation than in the past. 
Sacralising land may  be an old strategy, but it may be a particularly potent one in its modern 
manifestation.
While I have focused on the cognitive perceptions of sacred land, this approach needs to be 
complemented by sociological and economic perspectives for a more comprehensive 
understanding of land sacralisation. Future work must also explore the determinants of land 
sacralisation and its association with warfare. Why are lands sacralised in some disputes but not 
in others? What conditions favour land sacralisation? We also have little understanding of the 
social process of land sacralisation.[79] How does the initial impetus for land sacralisation arise 
– is it a result of grass-roots movements or the manipulations of elites? And most importantly, we 
need more detailed studies on the ways in which external constituencies can encourage religious 
change that would open avenues for productive conflict resolution.
As captured in his famous quote which opened this paper, philosopher Alfred Korzybski 
convincingly  argued that an abstraction derived from something is not the thing itself. Indeed, 
the abstract conception of land that emerges when it is sacralised is not the land itself. That 
abstract conception is sacred and indeed indivisible. However, that should not be confused with 
the land itself. The analysis presented here does not claim that attachments to the physical land 
are not real; they  are. However, the notion that particular lands are indivisible because they are 
sacred needs to be reconsidered. Sacred lands are both a physical reality  and an idealised 
abstraction; successful negotiations will divide the physical reality, but they will need to respect 
religious commitments and keep sacred abstractions of the lands intact.
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Table 1: Summary of comparison between sacred land, space, and objects.
Characteristics of Sacred Things Land Space Object
Physical Qualities
Construction Natural Human Human
Permanence High Low Low
Size Large Medium Small
Internalisation
Symbolised High Low Low
Myths High Low-Med-High Low-Med-High
Discourse High Medium Low
Ritual activity Medium High High
Cultural Conceptions
Desecration Yes / No Yes Yes
Danger / Monitor behaviour Low High High
Exclusivity Low Medium-High Medium-High
Boundaries Ambiguous Unambiguous Unambiguous
Mundane activity High Low Low
Abstraction Med-High Low Low
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Decentralised Leadership in Contemporary Jihadism: Towards a 
Global Social Movement
by Romain Bartolo
On October 19th 2003, nearly six months after the outset of the invasion of Iraq by  US troops, a 
video was released by al-Qaeda media arm al-Sahab showing Osama bin Laden directly 
threatening Spain. In his words, Spain, then governed by Prime Minister José Maria Aznar from 
the Partido Popular (PP), may  face a terrorist attack should Spanish military forces continue to 
be part  of the coalition that  invaded Iraq[1] and toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Less than 
six months later, on March 11th 2004, Madrid was shaken by coordinated bomb attacks in several 
commuter trains at peak hours, killing 191 people and wounding thousands. The “first well-
known al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist conspiracy in Europe”[2] had been in preparation for years 
thanks to the long-term presence of radical Islamists on Spanish soil. The first jihadist bombing 
on this continent since 9/11[3] seemed to have answered Osama bin Laden’s warning call. Those 
who later claimed responsibility for these attacks pointed out Iraq as their main source of 
motivation. Symbolically  the bombings were carried out a few days before the first anniversary 
of Iraq’s invasion. On the national scene, because “terrorism is meant to terrify”[4] and affect an 
audience, terrorists clearly intended to affect the outcome of the national general elections 
scheduled three days later. The Madrid terrorists were not self-starters, nor were they members of 
al-Qaeda who had performed an oath of allegiance to bin Laden. Instead, they  were mostly first-
generation immigrants from Northern Africa or the Near East who had been settled in Spain for 
years, had decent jobs and for some of them wives and children[5]. The setting up of the Madrid 
bombings was an illustration of the rising context of the contemporary jihadist movement, 
targeting a country  and blaming it for what was happening thousands of kilometres away. This 
example is highly valuable to describe the continuously evolving nature of the jihadist movement 
up to now. 
A splinter group within Islamism
The contemporary jihadist  movement, be it nicknamed “leaderless jihad”[6], “jihadi 
international”[7], “neojihadism”[8] or the “global social movement”[9], has progressively 
broken away from modern Islamism as embodied by Hasan al-Banna[10], Sayyid Qutb, 
Mawdudi or Ayatollah Khomeini. Islamism was conceptualised as a political ideology that aimed 
to Islamise society and state through the enforcement of sharia and to revive the value of Islam 
as a cornerstone of socio-political life[11]. By the time Islam had become a powerful rallying 
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tool to oppose governments, most Muslim countries had secular and nationalist regimes such as 
Egypt, Iraq or even Indonesia[12]. In the wake of the successive waves of independence in the 
second half of the twentieth century, radical Islam progressively affected other Muslim countries. 
Over the last thirty years, radical Islamist groups have extensively referred to the concept of 
jihad. Jihad has increasingly been conceived by these groups as armed struggle wherever 
Muslims are oppressed. Islam is not a monolithic block[13], like Islamism and its various 
subcategories[14]. There has been growing disagreement and opposition between the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, a socio-political mass organisation that has engaged in politics when not 
banned by successive Egyptian regimes, and Salafi-jihadist  groups such al-Qaeda or Algerian 
Islamic Armed Group (GIA)[15]. The opposition lies on various points that nurture heated debate 
within Islamist circles, and illustrates perfectly that a wide array  of schools of thought exists in 
political Islam. Indeed, mainly symbolised by  the showdown between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and al-Qaeda, disagreements lie in issues such as democracy, takfir (declaring Muslims to be 
apostates), or the carrying out of indiscriminate violence towards civilians on American and 
European soils[16]. The Muslim Brotherhood condemned the 9/11 attacks, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi’s call to kill Shia in Iraq and more generally al-Qaeda terrorist agenda[17]. The fact that 
al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri went online in April 2008 to answer questions and 
criticise the Muslim Brotherhood[18] strikingly shows that, within a broad Islamist movement 
united by the promotion of a pro-Islamist political agenda,  tactics and strategies differ highly 
from one organisation to another. 
Jihadism in its current form is not homogenous either. Most jihadist groups are of Salafi-
Wahhabi tradition, an extremist  branch of Sunni Islam that is known for its “selectively  literal 
interpretation of [Islam’s] sacred texts”[19]. It is essential to bear in mind that the Salafi 
movement is heterogeneous and made up of different factions and schools of thought. As 
illustrated by Quintan Wiktorowicz, “the Salafi movement […] reflects a broad array  of positions 
regarding issues related to politics and violence”[20]. Particularly, three different factions are to 
be distinguished within Salafism: “purists” who are nonviolent, do not engage in politics and 
who focus on da’wa and religious education; “politicos” who “emphasize the application of the 
Salafi creed to the political arena”[21]; and jihadis favouring violence to establish Islamic states
[22]. Nevertheless, all factions share common beliefs such as the concept of tawhid, or the unity 
and uniqueness of God. They unanimously  reject religious innovation and interpretation, and 
consider the Koran and Sunna to be the only  legitimate sources of law. Referred to as aqida, this 
“common religious creed revolves around strict adherence to the concept of tawhid and ardent 
rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire”[23]. Besides this, there is a common 
rejection of Western culture, and a willingness to avoid interactions with non-believers[24]. 
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Where factions disagree is on the context and the interpretation of contemporary  affairs, also 
illustrated by the words of a Jordanian jihadi leader, “the split  is not in thought; it is in 
strategy”[25].
The contemporary jihadist movement does not  follow the legacy of modern Islamism and is in 
fact a violent and “extremist splinter group  within Islamism”[26] that makes jihad a necessary 
and individual task. According to Petter Nesser, jihadist terrorists:
see terrorism as a legitimate and necessary  means of struggle in a campaign aiming to: 1. 
Re-Islamize the Muslim world by toppling local regimes they accuse of having become 
too secular and too dependent on the West, and, 2. Rid Muslim lands of Western 
influences[27]. 
Indeed, jihadists have been fighting two enemies at the same time, the “near enemy”[28] and the 
“far enemy”. The near enemy was until recent times the most important target in the eyes of 
Islamists. However, the gradual failure to topple secular regimes has led them to embrace a more 
international type of struggle.
The Afghan catalyst
The Salafi-Wahhabi jihadist movement is particularly embodied by al-Qaeda[29], and a wide 
array  of associated groups across the world. Members of these extremist groups were galvanised 
by the defensive jihad in Afghanistan when thousands of foreign fighters came to this 
mountainous country to fight the Soviet forces and defend what they perceived as a collective 
duty to protect their brothers of Islam. Despite a relatively  poor role in defeating the Soviet 
military, the ‘Afghan Arabs’ boasted about having successfully  brought to its knees one of the 
world’s two superpowers. While it united mujahideen in the 1980s, its aftermath led to heated 
debates within jihadist circles regarding the tactics and the strategy to embrace for the future[30]. 
Some Afghan veterans brought the experience and taste of jihad home, to Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Algeria, Bosnia, the West and many more places throughout the Muslim world[31].
Firstly, in today’s era, the jihadist movement would certainly be well described as a global social 
movement that has nurtured radicals around a common ideology. French sociologist Alain 
Touraine defines a social movement as “an answer either to a threat or a hope that is directly 
linked to the control that a social group has over its capacity to make decisions, to control 
changes and so on”[32]. Following 9/11, the threat  of jihadism has spread out, gained a global 
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audience, widened the theatre of actions[33] and threatened an increasing number of targets. 
Contemporary jihadism truly defines itself as a global social movement. As Michel Wieviorka 
pointed out in his study of global anti-movements in the globalised age, the preparation of the 
9/11 attacks involved individuals located on four different continents. The 9/11 hijackers, except 
for one, were born in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Four hijackers had socialised in Germany during 
their university education and had formed the Hamburg cell, later moving to the United States in 
order to learn how to fly  planes. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda Central had settled in Sudan in the 1990s 
before moving to Afghanistan and setting up  training camps for jihadi candidates[34]. The major 
change suffered by the jihadist movement deals with the huge structural shift undergone by al-
Qaeda, the main spokesperson of global jihadism, into a rallying cry for radical Islamists and 
angered Muslims. Secondly, due to the decentralised nature of jihadism, leadership has been 
affected. It has become less centralised[35] and relied on Osama bin Laden , at least until his 
death was announced on May 2nd, 2011, as a strategic leader and a uniting spiritual figurehead 
rather than a military  commander that sends direct orders to jihadists on the field. Nonetheless, 
less centralised leadership does not imply  ‘leaderless jihad’. Instead, accounts of the most recent 
terrorist attacks carried out in the name of al-Qaeda in its loosest sense since 9/11 suggest they 
were the result of radical local groups and networks linked through friendship, kinship and word 
of mouth contacts rather than the outcomes of individual self-radicalisations. 
The appeal of al-Qaeda ideology: a driver of franchised jihadism
Following increasing contacts and collaborations between al-Qaeda and like-minded groups in 
the 1990s, the contemporary  jihadist movement evolved into a more decentralised and fluid 
network. Jihadist groups have undergone a severe crackdown on their operational base since 9/11 
but have managed to cope with it well. As Jason Burke asserts, “al-Qaeda has become more 
lethal as an ideology than as an organisation”[36]. As a “vanguard”[37] of Islamist international 
terrorism, al-Qaeda symbolises the evolution of the jihadist threat in the post-9/11 environment. 
In this new era, there is no central hub that  serves as the main operational link between cells. 
Instead, cells do not cooperate with each other and do not generally know about the existence of 
other cells so as to reduce the likelihood of getting the whole picture if one cell is broken down. 
Consequently, “having no ‘hub’ to answer” contributes to minimise the impact of the destruction 
of individual cells on the organization as a whole”[38].
Al-Qaeda, from a hierarchical organisation to the vanguard of jihadist terrorism
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First of all, as a major player within the jihadist movement, al-Qaeda has transformed itself from 
a hierarchical terrorist organisation into something that has more to do with an appealing 
ideology than a structured paramilitary organisation. Before 9/11, jihadist attacks such as the 
1998 East Africa embassy  bombings and the 2000 USS Cole in Aden were directly linked to the 
core al-Qaeda spiritual and military leadership  based in Afghanistan. Those who had set up the 
operations were al-Qaeda operatives who followed orders of the al-Qaeda shura, the 
organisation’s decision-making body. At that time, jihadism had a clear command-and-control 
apparatus emanating from the top leadership. Besides, between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan provided al-Qaeda with a safe haven for jihadist leadership. Meanwhile, 
about an estimated 20,000 estimated jihadists trained in al-Qaeda camps[39]. The loss of the 
Afghan safe haven following the wave of US bombings from October 2001[40] put al-Qaeda as 
an organisation under great pressure. Financial assets were frozen, training camps were 
destroyed, and militants as well as senior al-Qaeda members were tracked down, captured or 
killed. Al-Qaeda has survived the capture or death of “80% of its global leadership 
structure”[41], such as military  chief Mohammed Atef[42], Khalid Sheikh Mohammed[43], and 
al-Qaeda-Jemaah Islamiyah operative Hambali[44]. The organisation has proved to be highly 
resilient[45] and has successfully  turned into a mass social movement attracting thousands of 
radicalised Muslims across the world. Indeed, the persistence of al-Qaeda as a terrorist threat 
does not lie in its military capabilities, which have been greatly  hampered since 2001. Rather, it 
goes well beyond these and deals with the attractiveness of jihadism to extremists, making al-
Qaeda just part of a broader extremist Salafi-Wahhabi movement[46].
The globalisation of jihadist militancy
Owing to this new hostile international security context where most Western and non-Western 
states adopt a tough stance against terrorism, the form of jihadist terrorism has become more 
complex to deal with. While jihadist militancy remained mainly local and confined to national 
boundaries in the 1990s, jihadism over the last ten years seems to have moved beyond borders 
thanks to increasing cooperation between associated groups. Global jihadism advocates were 
able to accomplish what had failed in the 1990s in local jihads such as in Algeria and Bosnia[47], 
that is to say, the submission of local conflicts in which Islam plays a part to a global narrative 
that puts Islam at the core. Back in the 1990s, local jihadist groups had waged war on their 
national governments but had been reluctant to join al-Qaeda’s global struggle. These 
unsuccessful local jihads and “the subsequent failure to establish an Islamic state in a given 
country”[48] may have “pushed the Islamists to go ‘global’”[49]. What can be said is that Osama 
bin Laden became a uniting point in jihadist militancy by  gathering a large number of terrorist 
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groups into his sphere of influence. Jihadist  groups have adopted brand-new names that 
symbolically refer to the allegiance they pledged to the al-Qaeda agenda[50], such as al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers and even al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algerian-based terrorist group  formerly called Salafi Group for 
Call and Combat (GSPC)[51]. Leaders of these organisations swore their allegiance to Osama 
bin Laden, al-Qaeda and their strategic objectives. In his analysis of the GSPC as a “glocal 
terrorist organisation”[52], Jean-Luc Marret shows how internal debate within this group  sparked 
tensions between on the one hand, those who wanted to keep the struggle local and, on the other 
hand, those who advocated going global. The contemporary  jihadist movement has evolved 
thanks to the growing appeal of al-Qaeda ideology and personal links between high-profile 
terrorists. This naming illustrates the franchising of jihadism in the “age of networked 
terrorism”[53]. This mix of ideology  and individuals has made the jihadist threat successful in its 
attempt to go global. Indeed, al-Qaeda and other extremist terrorist groups have all found 
common grounds to subscribe to this mutually  beneficial relationship. By doing so, al-Qaeda 
offsets its operational disability to carry out another large-scale attack[54] and has increasingly 
relied on various affiliated terrorist groups, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba 
or other European terrorist networks. Al-Qaeda, as a label, provided all these movements with 
the global audience they were looking for. It  increases “public awareness”[55] of groups who are 
willing to publicise their cause.  It is particularly relevant regarding the complicated relationship 
between terrorism and the media sphere. Because al-Qaeda-related terrorism has been, in 
general, defined as the most serious non-state threat to governments[56] lately, subscribing to al-
Qaeda’s worldwide agenda has given jihadists the opportunity to hit  the headlines because of the 
media’s attraction towards a “dramatizing effect”[57]. By the same token, the vanguard of 
jihadism benefited from this cooperation by claiming responsibility  for the attack once it  had 
already happened. Al-Qaeda strives to retrieve the political message sent by the terrorist attack 
and confer retrospectively its approval or refusal. The case of Nigerian ‘underpants bomber’ 
Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab may well fit the description of al-Qaeda’s willingness to bless the 
failed plot. Marc Sageman’s following words illustrate this trend: 
Their [adherents’] official acceptance into al-Qaeda comes after the fact, […] al-Qaeda 
Central does not know who its followers are, and is reduced to accepting them after the 
adherents declare themselves in an act of terrorism[58]. 
This structural shift in the jihadist movement was made possible because al-Qaeda and Osama 
bin Laden had managed to create “a narrative”[59]. According to French scholar Olivier Roy:
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The success of Osama bin Laden is not to have established a modern and efficient 
Islamist political organisation, but to have invented a narrative that could allow rebels 
without a cause to connect with a cause[60]. 
The “glocal” organisational structure of contemporary jihadism
The jihadist movement has been torn between globalism and localism. Nowadays, it seems that 
the tendency is leaning towards globalism but it is not an entirely  pure global trend. Rather, we 
should adopt what Zygmunt Bauman conceptualises as “glocalisation”. The contemporary 
jihadist movement fits the definition of a social movement given by Brian Jackson, who asserts 
that a social movement is “a group of people with a common ideology who try together to 
achieve certain general goals”[61], well. Despite being broad, this definition illustrates how 
today’s jihadism has evolved – the original al-Qaeda network, by uniting around an openly 
violent ideology, into “ad-hoc terrorist networks, imitators, emulators and a strategic union of 
like-minded companies”[62]. Assuming that the globalisation of jihadism has reduced the 
importance of leadership may be misleading. The new face of contemporary  jihadism still 
depends on leadership at some point and “it would be wrong to conclude that the central al-
Qaeda organization is no longer a threat”[63].
From the end of a clear command-and-control leadership to a divided and decentralised 
leadership
Although Osama bin Laden gave the 9/11 hijackers his approval to go ahead with their plans, one 
cannot but notice that nowadays the jihadist movement goes well beyond him and al-Qaeda in 
terms of operational leadership  and spiritual guidance. What Western and Muslim countries have 
dealt with for the last ten years differs from an organisation with a genuine command-and-
control apparatus assessing targets, providing funds and carrying out the attack. Contemporary 
jihadism has shaken a large number of countries. The choice of targets has diversified, ranging 
from police stations and embassies in Pakistan, religious buildings in Djerba to hotels in Jakarta, 
oil pipelines in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or public transport in Madrid and London. In the same 
period of time, terrorist  plots were foiled in Singapore, Scotland and Canada, and thousands of 
jihadist sympathisers were arrested in a dozen countries[64]. Clearly, post-9/11 jihadism does not 
rely  on a small number of leaders, so “the death or incarceration of [its] leadership  and severe 
losses to [its] membership […] is not terminal to [its] struggle”[65]. The persistence of al-Qaeda 
as a common narrative has succeeded because leadership does not solely lie on the shoulders of 
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high-profile international terrorists. Rather than a global one, leadership  has become more local 
and fragmented at the operational level.
However, strategic leadership rested upon the shoulders and aura of Osama bin Laden, who, 
despite having been described as a modest and soft-spoken man by Western journalists[66], was 
an essential figurehead. Leadership within contemporary jihadism still matters, hence the limited 
ability  of Internet self-radicalised individuals to go ahead with their self-organised plans. 
Leadership has expanded thanks to the use of the Internet[67], which has proven to be an 
efficient recruiting tool for de-territorialised jihadists - individuals that will cross the violence 
threshold based on an array of overseas events. Abu Musab al-Suri’s plan is to urge would-be 
jihadists to train autonomously wherever they can in order to create “a system, not an 
organisation”[68]. Examples of “autonomous jihad”[69] are to be found in the cases of self-
proclaimed cell leaders Abdul Nacer Benbrika in Australia and Mohammed Siddique Khan. 
Local imam in a Melbourne suburb, Benbrika was a “spiritual sanctioner”[70] of both Melbourne 
and Sydney  cells, whose targets were official government buildings and a nuclear plant[71]. 
Trends in autonomous jihad are symbolised by Benbrika’s own sanction of a suicide attack after 
the question was asked by  a cell member[72]. In Khan’s case, his decision to visit Pakistan[73] 
and engage in training with extremist groups in 2004 and 2005 illustrates his commitment to 
jihad and consequently  his leadership within the four-man commando. These individuals “are not 
‘name-brand’ terrorists or part of any known terrorist group” but rather “are like-minded 
individuals”[74] who were inspired by al-Qaeda, radicalised, indoctrinated and who 
progressively embraced jihad. 
The influence of jihadist leadership on European soil
Many terrorist  attacks were claimed to be carried out by self-starters, such as the London 
bombers or the murderer of controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. Further evidence 
showed a much deeper commitment to the global jihadist cause and decentralised leadership. 
Mohammed Bouyeri, van Gogh’s murderer, belong to the Hofstad Group, a Dutch jihadist group 
led by Syrian radical preacher Abu Khatib[75]. The very same group had plans to bomb 
Amsterdam international airport and government buildings[76]. The London bombers were all 
British citizens educated within the framework of the British system. Contacts with Pakistani 
groups were easily  made through family acquaintances, given that cell leader Mohammed 
Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer were of Pakistani descent and still maintained close links 
with their relatives in Pakistan. These two individuals kept contact with extremists in Pakistan 
and the UK “up  until the attack itself”[77]. Therefore, it  cannot be claimed that these attacks 
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were solely grounded in a European context. To a certain extent, it shows how global the jihadist 
movement has become. British-born citizens[78] bombed their own country  and killed their 
fellow citizens, blaming them for their indirect involvement in the killing of thousands of 
innocent Iraqis. The issue of leadership in this case clearly  shows a cell leader, Mohammed 
Siddique Khan, an influential person, leading young radicals in their early  twenties. More 
generally, dealing with the leadership of the contemporary  jihadist movement has become as 
complex as dealing with the global jihadist ideology. Leadership has become more diffuse, 
whether it is operational, ideological, or due to the charisma of an individual. Osama bin Laden’s 
success was grounded on his ability to co-opt like-minded terrorist  groups and also to inspire a 
certain number of radical individuals or religious authorities to embrace his violent agenda and 
ideology. Since 9/11 and the structural change undergone by  al-Qaeda into the franchising of 
Islamist terrorism, authority  in the jihadist movement has been divided. Leadership and authority 
do not solely  emanate from high-profile terrorists but also from radical imams who have 
extensive links with extremist groups overseas in Pakistan, Iraq or the Maghreb. In all instances 
of jihadism in post-9/11 Europe, “the Iraq war was a significant motivational factor for the 
Islamist terrorists”[79].
Osama bin Laden, a uniting guide rather than a military leader
Until early  May 2011, Osama bin Laden remained a figurehead of the jihadist  movement, even 
though authority and leadership have become less personalised. In a certain way, and despite the 
fact that contemporary jihadism does not solely  deal with interpersonal links, Osama bin Laden 
gained a highly charismatic profile within the movement, making him a naturally powerful 
leader. His videos and statements still resonate in the ears, hearts and minds of extremists and 
sympathisers. Following the announcement of his death , the various online testimonies aired by 
sympathisers and jihadist websites revealed that bin Laden strongly mattered and that his death, 
in one way or another, is a watershed[80]. Even if al-Qaeda can no longer conduct a large-scale 
terrorist attack, “al-Qaeda leaders continue to highlight potential targets and transmit operational 
directives”[81]. Terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia[82] and the Madrid bombings occurred months 
after Osama bin Laden had himself threatened those countries with the likelihood of a bombing. 
Kinship and friendship as a first step into global jihad
Furthermore, increasing evidence shows that friendship, kinship  and word of mouth contacts are 
becoming an increasingly essential feature of the contemporary  jihadist movement’s 
organisational structure. Further police investigations in the wake of terrorist attacks have 
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	  	  	  	  	  Volume	  2,	  Issue	  1	  	  	  
52	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   June	  	  2011
unveiled the very nature of these “home-grown” networks, especially in Europe. In the case of 
the Madrid bombings and Theo van Gogh’s killing, initial descriptions of “self-financed, self-
sufficient and self-radicalised”[83] cells turned out to be partially wrong or at least too short-
sighted. The Madrid bombers were not home-grown terrorists. Mostly  from Moroccan, Algerian, 
and Syrian backgrounds[84], these extremists were in fact all linked though the Abu Dahdah[85] 
network.  As an al-Qaeda operative in Spain[86], he had extensive contacts with European 
jihadist circles in London such as influential al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri[87] and al-
Ansar editor Abu Qatada[88]. Further evidence shows that this network was also closely 
collaborating with the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group[89], itself linked to jihadists in 
Europe, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan[90]. This complex web of links shows the global aspect 
that shapes the jihadist movement. Terrorist  cells in Europe in the post-9/11 environment are 
defined by Jordan, Manas and Horsburgh as “grassroot jihadist networks”[91]. In their view, 
these networks embody “individuals that operate within the country that they reside and share the 
strategic objectives of the Global Jihad Movement (GJM) but do not formally  belong to the ‘Al-
Qaeda organisation’ or other associated groups”[92]. Unquestionably they are part of “a wider 
hierarchical organization, and depend on the directives of that organization at strategic and 
operational levels”[93] and embrace this jihadist narrative. This definition of “grassroot  jihadist 
networks” fits the descriptions of the Madrid bombers’ network, the 7/7 London suicide bombers 
and the Hofstad Group well. These individuals, either European-born or European immigrants, 
were radicalised in Europe through friendship and kinship. Indeed, political violence and 
terrorism may not be embraced by a personal move towards radicalism. One’s grievances, 
whether social, religious, political or economic, have to be framed into a narrative that resonates. 
All potential causes of terrorism, such as anger, political frustration, feelings of humiliation or 
despair may impact on one’s behaviour, particularly if these beliefs are commonly shared and 
felt. Terrorism clearly is a group  process. Framing terrorism into a “group adventure”[94] may 
contribute to an understanding of how individuals turned their backs on their own societies or 
their countries of residence. For instance, an account of the formation of the Hofstad Group  in 
the Netherlands indicates that most group  members originated from the Rif Valley in Northern 
Morocco. An analysis of the Madrid network members similarly  illustrates that the group grew 
by word of mouth. Some members, radical Muslims, encouraged their friends who felt some 
degree of alienation to join this terrorist cell[95]. In the meantime, European governments 
conducted hundreds of arrests of would-be jihadists across the continent[96], showing that the 
continent is not immune to the threat of “Europe’s angry  Muslims,”[97] in Robert Leiken’s 
words. The same thing can be said about the deadliest terrorist cell that emerged from Europe, 
the Hamburg cell. In the late 1990s, Hamburg was the place where Mohammed Atta, Ziad Jarrah 
and Marwan al-Shehhi met, socialised and were radicalised during their university  years. In the 
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case of those three 9/11 pilots, they  had become involved in radicalism in Europe, and sought al-
Qaeda guidance. They, typically, offered al-Qaeda their skills, not the other way around. 
Therefore, it  can be said that within the contemporary jihadist movement “the main groups did 
not recruit individuals. Rather, they entered the movement”[98].
This divided type of leadership, social bonds between individuals and Osama bin Laden’s 
charismatic authority have characterised the evolution of the jihadist movement towards a highly 
decentralised structure after the 9/11 attacks. Contemporary  jihadism on the global scale as it has 
been previously defined differs from the hierarchical terrorist organisation that directly planned 
the 1998 East Africa embassy attacks, the USS Cole attack in Aden and 9/11. Over the last 
decade, the franchising of jihadism has been embodied by the growing use of affiliated terrorist 
groups or less importantly inspired sympathisers who crossed the violence threshold to carry out 
deadly acts on behalf of this extremist, violent and deviant ideology. In other words and despite 
the post-9/11 global crackdown on al-Qaeda leaders and operatives, al-Qaeda has managed to 
maintain its resilience in the international system by subcontracting its deadly acts of terror to 
individuals and groups ready to take up the challenge on its behalf. Bouyeri, Khan, the Madrid 
bombers, Indonesian and Pakistani terrorists among many others all put into practice bin Laden 
and Zawahiri’s various calls for indiscriminate violence against  their numerous identified 
enemies, ranging from Western military personnel to Muslim and non-Muslim innocent civilians. 
To conclude, leadership in the contemporary jihadist movement has been dispersed well beyond 
its most visible spokespersons like late Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri. It  has become 
more elusive to deal with. As a consequence, the complex structure of contemporary jihadism 
has reinforced its resilience and made the fight against jihadist violence more difficult for 
governments, security  departments and intelligence agencies. The fact that leadership still 
matters shows that at  some point hierarchy and personal authority remain a critical feature of the 
jihadist movement too. Despite its highly decentralised nature, today’s global jihadism still 
requires leadership so that the movement’s followers can move forward with their plans and 
fulfil the agenda. Should Osama bin Laden and the extremist ideology he stood for stop  being an 
inspirational force for radicals, campaigns of terrorist violence in the name of jihad could 
possibly wane in the medium term. Now that the ten-year-long manhunt for the capture of 
Osama bin Laden came to an abrupt end, the issue of leadership within the jihadist movement 
has become all the more essential. Still regarded as an operational success, the targeted killing of 
Osama bin Laden has now widened the window of opportunity  for commentaries and predictions 
about the next  command-and-control structure that al-Qaeda is likely  to adopt. Despite it is too 
early to draw some definite conclusions, what now needs to be discussed in the coming weeks 
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and months are the possible scenarios[99]. The death of Osama bin Laden is not synonymous to 
the end of contemporary jihadism, as hierarchy  in al-Qaeda did not  essentially  matter as much as 
it would for other traditional terrorist organisations that suffered a clear decline after the killing 
or the arrest of their leader, such as Shoko Asahara in Aum Shinrikyo. Nevertheless, this targeted 
killing, after dozens of senior al-Qaeda operatives, military  commanders and militants were 
arrested or killed over the last decade, symbolises the loss of impetus taken by contemporary 
jihadism.  Whether al-Qaeda central has the ability to perform a transfer of leadership to a new 
leader in order to survive his founder’s death is still unknown and hard to guess. The two most 
visible scenarios that might emerge for the future of the jihadist movement depend on the view 
one has about global jihad, as represented summarily by the 2008 debate between Marc Sageman 
and Bruce Hoffman. Thus, from an al-Qaeda central perspective, the next phase of jihadism 
depends on the possibility for al-Qaeda to name a new leader, such as bin Laden’s long-time 
deputy  and al-Qaeda ideologue Ayman al-Zawahiri, propaganda chief Abu Yahya al-Libi, or less 
prominent contenders, to continue to send orders and provide general guidance[100]. From a 
more networked approach, the resilience of jihadism will be assessed on whether the seeds of 
terror have sufficiently been diffused among the wide jihadist circle of sympathisers globally to 
sustain the struggle in this post-bin Laden era. 
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Opinion Pieces
Electoral Politics and ETA’s ceasefire
by Javier Argomaniz
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
University of St Andrews
The recent Euskadi ta Alkartasuna (ETA) ceasefire declaration has been received with much 
interest and fanfare by  the international media. The same announcement was met instead with a 
tangible lack of enthusiasm by  Spanish and Basque political figures.  The Spanish president 
Zapatero, the Basque president Lopez and Urkullu, the leader of the most voted Basque 
nationalist party (PNV), agreed that  the communiqué was a ‘step forward’ but ultimately 
‘insufficient’ and ‘not the news the country had been hoping for’. Such mix of scepticism and 
disappointment is partly a product of the previous failed experience with the 2006 ETA truce. 
Months of painstakingly slow negotiations between ETA and government representatives were 
then shattered with a bomb attack at Madrid airport  that killed two people. The outcome left the 
Zapatero’s government frustrated and unwilling to get their fingers burnt again.
Yet there are in fact a few interesting divergences from the 2006 ceasefire. The use of words 
‘general’ and ‘verifiable by the international community’ are new and help to separate this 
statement from the 2006 declaration, which was also ‘permanent’. The latter has already been 
rejected by the Spanish Deputy Prime Minister Rubalcaba: Spain will not accept the involvement 
of international mediators and any hypothetical disarmament process would be verified by the 
Spanish security  forces. The former is more relevant in practice as it would involve the 
termination of ‘kale borroka’ (street fighting) activities and the extortion of Basque businessmen 
under the so-called ‘revolutionary tax’. There is an additional novelty:  a commitment for a 
‘lasting resolution towards an end to the armed confrontation’.  This phrase has never been used 
by ETA before but it comes with the caveat that the dissolution of the group should follow the 
fulfilment of political conditions such as territoriality and self-determination.  
So it is not quite a familiar case of ‘more of the same’ and the government’s response may  be 
viewed by some, not least by  Gerry Adams, as a missed opportunity ‘for a lasting peace and a 
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new beginning in the relationship between the Basque people and the Spanish state’. At the same 
time, it is not hard to understand this response if we examine the current security and political 
context. There is a clear strategic logic behind the Spanish government decision: from their point 
of view, the current approach is working. ETA is terminally ill, having been hit hard by not only 
hundreds of arrests in recent years product of close French-Spanish cooperation but  also the 
impact of the judicial investigations that since the late 1990s have dismantled their intricate 
support network. The general view within the socialist party and the state’s judicial and police 
authorities is that they have the upper hand and there is little need for a change in tactics. Proof 
that the pressure has not wavered comes from the recent arrests of two alleged ETA members in 
France and, in a separate operation, 10 members of EKIN, ETA’s political apparatus.  
However a much less talked about motive for the government’s reaction is rather more 
pedestrian: electoral politics. Opening negotiations again is seen as a politically  very risky move 
in a context where the economic crisis is rapidly eroding the party’s support amongst the Spanish 
electorate.  The socialists are not willing to lose ground on this matter and will attempt to out-
toughen the opposition and play hard-ball with ETA’s demands. 
Importantly, electoral politics not only helps us to contextualise the Government’s response, they 
are also crucial to understand ETA’s decision to announce a ceasefire on the first place. It is clear 
by now that  ETA is militarily  very weak, totally incapable to bring the independence of the 
Basque region by force of arms alone.  A November 2010 poll by Basque Country University 
puts the backing of ETA’s violent methods down to about 3% of the Basques. Incidentally, 
support for independence comes to 28% of the population.  Whereas ETA’s young ranks continue 
with their enthusiastic advocacy of violent action, the older generations have grown disenchanted 
and dissension within imprisoned members means that the numbers of those supportive of a 
political solution within the group are growing. The future prospects look bleak for the terrorist 
organisation. 
On the other hand, the main source of pressure for the 2011 declaration has not come internally 
but from Batasuna, the group’s political wing. The explanation again comes from political 
calculations: banned since 2003 following a court ruling that provided evidence of operational 
support to ETA, Batasuna leaders have grown concerned of losing ground to other pro-
independence Basque political parties. After losing a third of their support, the fear is that these 
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legal parties that work within the institutions and oppose ETA violence would continue attracting 
the votes of their traditional electorate while they  stand in the wilderness outside the normal 
political process. Eusko Alkartasuna  (EA) would benefit much from the continuation of the 
present situation: a party that has participated in several Basque regional governments in 
coalition with PNV, it supports similar economic policies and political goals.  Alternatiba and 
Aralar, a scion of the old Batasuna, are other potential beneficiaries.  Trapped and increasingly 
irrelevant, Batasuna needs to return to the institutions in the next elections and they can only do 
so by renouncing their support for violence and severing their operational links with ETA. A 
legalised Batasuna could then establish a united pro-independence left-wing political front with 
EA and Alternatiba and regain their footing in Basque politics. The imprisoned leadership’s 
strategy is backed now by a majority  of the Batasuna base and it is obvious that an inactive ETA 
would greatly assist in the process. 
In sum, the banning of Batasuna has eventually encouraged their leaders to put pressure on ETA 
for a ceasefire that would facilitate their legalisation and subsequent participation in the next 
local and regional elections. Attention will be shifted then to whether the Spanish judicature rules 
the new name, lists and rules compliant with the Ley de Partidos.  If so, this would help to 
validate their strategy and encourage Batasuna’s leadership to impose their views on ETA’s 
leadership for the very first time. If Batasuna’s proxy is rejected –as with other previous 
attempts- there will be a renewed internal debate: will this strengthen the desire of Batasuna’s 
top-ranks for a non-violent path to the independence of Basque country? Or will this give 
arguments to the more hardcore elements in ETA and the dissenting minority  within the party 
that a return to terrorism is necessary?  
This was originally published on the 24/01/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/journal/
opinionpieces/opinionpieces/files/electoral-politics-and-etas-ceasefire.html
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The Need for Situational Awareness in a CBRNE Attack
by Jordan Nelms
Witt Associates
Washington D.C., US
Six years before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and eight years 
before the United States went to war with Saddam Hussein for his alleged concealment of 
chemical and biological weapons caches, Japan's Tokyo subway was struck by  one of the most 
vicious terror attacks in modern history.  The 1995 Sarin terrorist attack represents an important 
case study for post-9/11 emergency managers because it highlights the key issues first  responders 
and public health officials face when confronted with a CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive) mass-casualty attack.
The after-action reporting following the Tokyo Sarin attack noted serious deficiencies in the 
identification of the threat, and the escalating confusion about why so many obviously sick 
people were coming out of the subway station. First  responders arrived on the scene quickly – 
but, because Sarin is an invisible gas, fire and EMS units were unaware that the scene was hot 
and did not know the nature of the threat they were facing. Although they  did an effective job 
evacuating and getting people out of the subway station, their failure to take precautionary 
measures specific to a CBRNE attack caused the unnecessary contamination of hundreds of first 
responders themselves as well as innocent bystanders. Hospitals became a primary 
decontamination area by default, putting emergency room doctors and other hospital workers and 
patients also at risk for contamination.
Recognizing these challenges, in 1995 the U.S. Department of Energy embarked on the research 
and development of an Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS), the purpose of which 
is to pre-position detection devices in high-threat environments, increasing the situational 
awareness of first responders and emergency managers dealing with a CBRNE incident.
PROTECTing the Responders – The First Priority
Sandia National Laboratories initiated testing, in 2000, of an APDS specifically designed to meet 
the need of U.S. subway  systems by simultaneously detecting a number of chemicals, viruses, 
and toxins.  Meanwhile, the Program for Response Operations and Technology Enhancements 
for Chemical/Biological Terrorism (PROTECT) was being piloted by the Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). In 2003, after three years of testing, PROTECT 
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became a permanent program at WMATA, and now operates in over a dozen high-volume 
stations along the Authority's Metro system.
An important responsibility of an emergency manager is to protect the safety and health of first 
responders.  Increasing the emergency managers' ability to make informed decisions in the face 
of a CBRNE attack not only  has a critical impact on the first responders' ability to save the lives 
of attack victims, but also protects them from personally  becoming victims.  The success of the 
PROTECT program has the potential to become a mainstay  in the homeland security  programs 
of other major metropolitan cities.  The APDS technology  is now well established, and in wide 
use by the Department of Defense.  The PROTECT program, on the other hand, because of its 
relative infancy  and much higher cost, faces considerable barriers before national 
implementation would be possible.
The fact is that, as in many other homeland security initiatives, federal funding does not match 
the realistic cost of capability implementation.  Nor can these high technology programs be paid 
for from the subway operators' general funds.  A key theme of the DHS (Department of 
Homeland Security) UASI (Urban Area Security Initiative) and Transit Security Grant programs 
focuses on the protection of critical infrastructure, including the nation’s subway  systems. 
Ninety-six percent of the Transportation Security  Administration’s Tier I funds awarded to the 
National Capital Region, and seventy-one percent of the funds awarded to the New York Region, 
were allocated to infrastructure protection projects.  Those projects served as pilot programs for 
the rollout of many critical technology solutions – and the subway systems of both cities, 
according to DHS, are at the highest risk of a CBRNE attack.  Associations and subway 
operators are continuing to lobby DHS for additional funding in this area, hoping to expand the 
PROTECT system beyond Washington, New York, and Boston.  It is clear that operators see the 
benefit in such a system, and understand that  the only way to procure the technology is through 
federal grants.
Subway operators are hopeful that, after the PROTECT program becomes standardized in its 
technology and implementation requirements, it will be expanded to other major metropolitan 
cities.  At present, however – almost 15 years after the Tokyo Sarin attack, and 11 years since the 
inception of PROTECT – operators are increasingly anxious to know DHS’s intentions for a 
national rollout. At present they can only hope, though, that after that happens there will be not 
only clear guidance provided but also the development of the technology standards required and 
an infusion of follow-on grant funds.
In the competitive grant environment that DHS facilitates, emergency managers, first  responders, 
and subway  patrons alike are hopeful that the department's risk-based awards are increased, and 
the PROTECT system be allowed to proliferate in major cities around the nation.
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Jordan Nelms is a homeland security planner for Witt Associates, a Washington DC based 
consulting firm founded by former U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
Director James Lee Witt. He has been responsible for providing planning to federal, state and 
local agencies across the United States, focusing on terrorism and man made disaster 
preparedness and response. He received his Master of Arts in Global Security Studies from Johns 
Hopkins University, and is a graduate of the CSTPV Terrorism Certificate program.
This was originally published on the 02/02/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/journal/
opinionpieces/opinionpieces/files/abbfd5ecf89ee30cb6a41ca2b3d42ece-3.html
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Repairing the Cracked lens:  Redefining British Muslim Identity in 
Conservative Britain
by Abdul Haqq Baker
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews
St Andrews, UK
The recent landmark election results in 2010 witnessed the end of an era for Labour under 
Gordon Brown and the herald of a new political landscape with the Coalition government of the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.  The challenges for the new coalition are no less daunting 
than they were under the former government. The need to examine aspects of British identity 
from political and cultural perspectives has never been more poignant, especially in the face of 
continuing threats from domestic and international extremism – both far right and religious. The 
defeat of the BNP in Dagenham last year, resulting in all of its twelve councilors failing to be 
reelected can be considered a positive outcome for British politics so far as right wing extremism 
is concerned. The increase in Muslim MPs is also considered by  many  as another positive for 
British politics. While these apparent achievements may reflect the more appealing façade of the 
political climate, a redefining of who and what represents Muslim identity in 21st century Britain 
is necessary in view of the increasing misunderstanding and rictus gap between wider non-
Muslim  society and Muslim communities.
A question of legitimacy: Who can and should speak on behalf of British Muslims?
It can be argued that the very  question of legitimacy is what underscored part of the Liberal 
Democrats’ reasoning to align themselves with the Conservatives and form a coalition 
government. Labour was no longer considered a legitimate representative for this country’s 
government in view of the losses inflicted upon them in the recent election. Brown was an 
unelected Prime Minister assuming the mantle of Tony Blair. The transfer of leadership  was on 
the basis of Labour parliamentary protocol and while it may be argued that the Conservatives did 
not win unanimously, Labour lost unequivocally. 
Legitimacy  should also be the yard stick to measure those claiming to represent  sections of 
British society. The BNP were resigned to defeat in east London as a racist, bigoted party, 
unrepresentative of the vast  majority  they  claimed to represent. They placed emphasis on anti-
Muslim sentiment in order to garner support from various communities, religious and irreligious, 
on the premise of creating resentment and fear of the ‘alien other.’ To some degree they have 
succeeded in attracting support from communities that were previously  considered antithetical to 
their manifesto and objectives. For example, a few members from Black and Ethnic Minority 
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(BME) communities now bolster the BNP’s ‘anti-Muslim’ support. Claims of legitimacy are not 
confined to these groups alone; Muslim led organisations have emerged post 9/11 and 7/7 with 
claims of representing the ‘silent majority’ of Muslims etc. However, a closer look at the lens 
through which these groups claim self-legitimacy will reveal the cracks and inconsistencies that 
tends to permeate their often polemical positions which in themselves are unrepresentative of the 
very communities they allege to represent.
Indeed, the failure to examine and challenge the legitimacy of self-publicised stories or claims 
can be damaging to some of the communities from where these individuals or groups first 
emerge.  In fact, such negligence in ascertaining the legitimacy of claims for the moral high 
ground have led to a proliferation of personalities either claiming a return from extremism, a 
return within the fold of democratic society  as ‘prodigal sons’ or as experts in the field of 
counter-radicalisation and extremism. Prior to the emergence of an extensive budget for the 
previous government’s Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Fund many of these voices were 
largely non-existent. Much criticism has been leveled against the PVE Funding; indeed, to a 
certain degree it is valid, especially insofar as it relates to the ineffectiveness of some 
organisations that received funding. The author of this account has himself been criticised for an 
altogether different reason; namely, that  being a so-called ‘non-violent radical’ is part of the 
problem and not the solution. A direct response to such criticism can be in regard to the issue of 
legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness in tackling violent extremism at grassroots – are the 
entities involved succeeding or not? Another response to such criticism is the simple observation 
on the additional but important factor relating to consistency - such entities have been consistent 
over the past 15-20 years combating violent extremist  propaganda. There have been no 
rudimentary  shifts in either ideology or methodology unlike more recently established 
organisations whose founders have completely metamorphosed into more societally  palatable 
groups in order to join the ever evolving counter-radicalisation arena. Is there anything to 
determine whether further transformations will occur in the future to accord with changing 
government policies and if so, what shape will they take? The chameleon-like characteristic of 
adapting to new environments and circumstances in order to fit either public or government 
perceptions or agendas should be a warning sign to policy  makers and practitioners alike, 
particularly in the latters’ race to provide ‘quick-fix’ solutions to counter violent radicalisation 
and terrorism  among British Muslims today. The tendency to ‘stir up anti-Muslim sentiment in 
an attempt to confer self-legitimacy’ [1]  should be another clear indicator to err on the side of 
caution when attempting to identify credible voices or partners among Muslim communities. 
Shared beliefs, shared values and social conservatism
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The socially  conservative practices of some Muslims are increasingly being regarded as anti-
social and a precursor to violent radicalisation. Yet many of these values held by such Muslims 
are akin to those of our parents and grandparents in 1940s-50s Britain. In fact, the values and 
beliefs held are not too dissimilar from those of the other Asiatic religions - Judaism and 
Christianity  - yet there is no current discourse available which accuses these faiths of anti-
socialism or violent – radicalism. 
Indeed, there are many adherents to various aspects of social conservatism from different walks 
of life in the UK today and they are not  marginalised for aspects of their beliefs or values that do 
not concur entirely with society. Indeed, they possess beliefs and values that accord  more with 
traditional societal beliefs than those at odds with it. This is the same with the vast majority of 
Muslims.  Many socially conservative Muslims have accepted a religious pluralism in Britain 
where they do not seek to impose their beliefs on others and, at the same time, not have some 
societal values – that have changed with the passage of time – imposed upon them as a 
requirement to prove their Britishness.  Until now, the issue of religious social conservatism has 
been largely a one sided affair, dominated by the usual suspects who are the most vocal in 
seeking to define Muslim identity in 21st century Britain. There is a need to redress this 
imbalance. 
Bridging existing areas of dissonance between Muslim communities and the wider majority 
society
British Muslim converts have an even more important role to play today in society  in view of 
their dual identities. Their voices have, on the whole, been muted in part  due to more vocal 
representations by the larger, predominant South Asian Muslim populace in Britain. While this is 
unsurprising due to the multifarious and complex social dimensions of this largely progressive 
section of Muslims, their representation of almost everything that is supposed to reflect Muslim 
‘Britishness’ should now be reexamined in view of the existence and growing influence of 
British converts to Islam.  Roald raises the following question when examining the impact of 
converts in a Scandinavian context:
How important is the role of new Muslims as intermediaries between Muslim communities and 
Scandinavian society? Is the particular position of new Muslims who have ‘one foot  in each 
culture’ beneficial for a fruitful dialogue between the two cultures?
Muslim converts traverse all spheres of British society and yet their voices are seldom heard 
against the backdrop  of socio-economic, political and religious issues that by and large relate to 
the predominant South Asian (and of late, increasingly Somali) culture. 
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Converts may  have greater empathy with non-Muslims because of their non-Muslim past and 
ongoing relationships with their family of origin. They  often have a heightened awareness, 
compared to other Muslims, of how Muslims are viewed by outsiders, so there can be a strongly 
reflexive element to their discourse.
Without  ignoring or marginalising the overwhelmingly positive contributions of these more 
predominant communities, British converts can play an invaluable role as conduits or bridge-
builders between the wider non-Muslim society and the more culturally  orientated Muslim 
communities. To varying degrees, some converts are already playing such roles, however not on 
the scale of their European counterparts:
New Muslims function on various levels in society  and...[those] who have a role as intermediary 
between Muslim immigrant communities and wider Scandinavian society  are mostly  highly 
educated. As academics they have the ability  to promote a balanced view of Islam and Muslims 
that might be accepted by  majority  society. They  also tend...to distinguish between ‘ideal Islam’ 
and ‘Muslim practice’...By this, non-Muslims might more easily  understand the complexity and 
the problematic issues of Muslim communities in Western society.
The importance of converts’ potential contribution between wider society and Muslim 
communities can no longer be ignored when considering the challenges of far right and religious 
extremism in society today. 
Dr. Baker is the former chairman of Brixton Mosque, London, the founder and a Director of 
STREET UK intervention programme and a Lecturer in Terrorism Studies at the University of St 
Andrews.  Based upon his 20 years of knowledge and experience in countering violent 
extremism, he has become an international speaker on the subject of radicalisation and 
extremism, and is widely acknowledged as an authority on in this field.
This was originally published on the 14/03/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/journal/
opinionpieces/opinionpieces/files/repairing-the-cracked-lens.html
Notes:
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What do ‘middle class’ terrorists tell us about the link between 
poverty and terrorism?
by Joel Busher
University of East London
London, UK
Introduced in 2006, the Prevent workstream of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy  (CONTEST) 
has provided a focus for often heated debates about what drives people to support or take part in 
violent extremism and terrorism in the UK. Six months after the new Conservative – Liberal 
Democrat coalition government announced an extensive review of Prevent, David Cameron used 
his speech to the Munich Security  Conference 2011 [1]to set out his position in relation to these 
debates. He distanced himself from what he referred to as the ‘hard right’ and the ‘soft left’. He 
criticised the ‘hard right’ for their failure to distinguish between Islam and Islamic extremism. He 
then criticised the ‘soft left’ who, he claimed, 
compil[e] a list  of grievances and argue that if only governments addressed these 
grievances, the terrorism would stop. So they point to poverty that so many Muslims live 
in and say, ‘get rid of this injustice and the terrorism will end’. But this ignores the fact 
that many of those found guilty of terrorism in the west and elsewhere have been 
graduates and often middle class. [2]
I do not intend to comment here on the position that Cameron outlined in his speech. I don’t 
propose to argue that there is a link between poverty  and terrorism [3], or that we should not be 
interested in the fact that many of those convicted of terrorism offences are university  educated 
and middle class. [4] Instead, I focus on the argument that Cameron made use of in this excerpt 
from his speech. I want to point out why such comments about ‘middle class’ terrorists tell us 
little about the lack of links between poverty and terrorism, and rather more about the ongoing 
problems we face with the way evidence is marshalled to support competing grand narratives 
about the ‘roots’ and ‘origins’ of extremism and terrorism. 
The argument Cameron makes is that, since a considerable proportion of people arrested under 
terrorism laws in Western countries are well educated and not from poor backgrounds, it cannot 
be claimed that poverty  is one of the main factors that push people towards extremism and 
terrorism. This is not a new argument. It has been raised by  Laqueur [5] and was mentioned in 
discussion several times during a recent government-run review of the evidence linking various 
social, psychological, political and economic factors to an increased risk of participation in 
	  Journal	  of	  Terrorism	  Research	  	  	  	  	  Volume	  2,	  Issue	  1	  	  	  
72	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   June	  	  2011
terrorism [6]. The main problem with this argument is that it knocks down a straw man. It attacks 
only the crude proposition that there is a correlation between being poor and participation in 
terrorism – that poor people are more likely to become terrorists than more wealthy  people 
(presumably because they are angry  or frustrated by their relative lack of wealth). Yet this is 
certainly not the most credible argument linking poverty  to extremism and terrorism. Indeed, 
such an argument would be a relic from the increasingly  outdated practices of trying to produce 
terrorist profiles or enumerate the factors that most accurately  predict who is likely  to support or 
take part in terrorism [7]. 
Any relationship between poverty  and terrorism is likely to be far more complicated [8]. It is 
plausible for example that when it can be claimed that poverty is concentrated within a particular 
population, this can give credence to narratives of systemic injustice, which in turn might be 
used to legitimise political violence by  some of the people who identify  with or claim to 
represent that population [9]. The existence of highly educated and middle class terrorists would 
have no bearing on such an argument because in this argument poverty is not conceived of as a 
measurable category to which individuals can be objectively allocated and which then impacts 
on that  individual. Instead, poverty is understood as a ‘social status’ [10] that is of symbolic 
value because it has the potential to connote injustice and provide a grievance around which to 
construct a shared identity  and mobilise support. Based on this understanding of the relationship 
between poverty and terrorism, the relevant question would not be whether a person has grown 
up in a ‘poor’ household, but whether they identify with populations that they  perceive to be 
disproportionately affected by poverty. 
It seems then that the existence of ‘middle class terrorists’ tells us nothing about whether or not 
poverty  contributes to extremism and terrorism, although it might tell us something about how it 
does (or does not). The persistence of the ‘middle class terrorists’ argument does however 
provide a worrying example of the way that information about terrorists and terrorist 
organisations is sometimes converted into evidence and used to support or discredit arguments 
about how we should respond to extremism and terrorism. In the last few years there have been 
growing calls within terrorism studies to shift the discourse away from ‘root  causes’ of why 
people become terrorists [11]. This is because the evidence that we have highlights the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the causal mechanisms in operation, with different factors 
becoming salient among different groups of people for different reasons at different times. 
However, as Cameron’s speech well illustrates, there is still considerable political capital to be 
gained from talking about and setting out plans to address the ‘roots’ and ‘origins’ of extremism 
and terrorism. Unfortunately, such endeavours and the pressure that they create to convert 
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information into evidence risk undermining efforts to achieve genuinely evidence based counter-
terrorist strategies. 
Joel Busher is a research fellow in the Law School at the University of East London. Prior to this 
post he worked as a strategic analyst within the Defence Science Technology Laboratory 
(DSTL).
This was originally published on the 07/04/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/journal/
opinionpieces/opinionpieces/files/busher-what-do-middle.html
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Revolts in the Arab world: is it bad news for Islamic terrorists?
by Eugenio Lilli
King’s College London
London, UK
Everything started when a young man set himself on fire in the provincial town of Sidi Bouzid, 
Tunisia. Mohamed Bouazizi, this was his name, was selling fruit and vegetables on the street 
without a license. After a policewoman stopped him and confiscated his cart and produce, he felt 
so angry  and desperate that he took that drastic decision. It  was December 17th,2010. Since then 
a long series of demonstrations, riots and revolts have quickly and unabatedly spread from 
Tunisia throughout the Arab world. Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Oman and 
Bahrain, among others, were all affected in one way or another by these events. Tunisia’s 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was ousted and Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak experienced 
the same fate. 
Should the West be worried that the events currently unfolding in the region will jeopardize its 
global effort in fighting international Islamic terrorism?
The common argument is that the chaos created by  these revolutions will play into the hands of 
fundamentalist Islamic groups, who will seize the opportunity to fill the resulting power vacuum. 
This fear has been fuelled for decades by  authoritarian regimes in order to obtain support from 
the West, and above all from the United States, to prolong their iron-fist rule. Recently, former 
Egyptian President Mubarak complained during an interview that he was fed up  of ruling Egypt, 
"but if I resign now, there will be chaos. And I'm afraid the Muslim Brotherhood will take over". 
His counterpart in Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, warned that "It  is obvious now that this 
issue is run by al Qaeda" and that the protesters are young people who are being manipulated by 
al Qaeda's Osama bin Laden. The intended audience of these statements is clearly not the Arab 
masses but rather the Western governments.
There are several reasons why the grim scenarios foreseen by Arab dictators and some of their 
Western supporters will not be likely to materialize. First of all, jihadist violent rhetoric has not 
ranked, so far, as one of the main reasons that brought so many people into the streets. Poverty, 
economic inequality, unemployment, greater political freedom, oppression and disgust for 
officials’ corruption are all more pressing issues than any fundamentalist religious one. A second 
young man in Tunisia who killed himself in protest allegedly shouted "no for misery, no for 
unemployment" before he electrocuted himself. In addition, neither al Qaeda nor any  other 
Islamist terrorist group has played any relevant role during these demonstrations. Osama bin 
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Laden has been silent. While the statements issued by his Egyptian deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, 
apparently had no significant resonance. 
On the contrary, there are promising elements suggesting that these revolts in Arab countries will 
strike severe blows to terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. In fact, two critical tenants of the 
Islamist terrorists’ narrative are that change in the Arab world can be only  achieved by  violent 
action and that Arab dictators are puppets controlled by the West, namely by the United States. 
As far as the first tenant is concerned, the nature and the outcome of these protests have hitherto 
disavowed such a claim. Most of the demonstrations were peaceful in nature and those which 
turned violent, and eventually resorted to the use of force, did that mainly in response to 
governmental crude repression- Libya being a clear example. Although not all the 
demonstrations have brought substantial political change, to date two succeeded in toppling 
dictators. In particular, Egyptian protesters through largely  peaceful actions achieved in a few 
weeks the goal of driving Mubarak out of office; a goal that al-Zawahri and other like-minded 
terrorists could not achieve in decades of bloody and violent jihad. 
As for the second tenant, the West, and the United States in particular, is indeed responsible of 
cutting deals with oppressive and autocratic regimes in the naïve hope of keeping at bay the 
spread of fundamentalist Islam. However, although slowly and cautiously, some may argue too 
slowly and too cautiously, the United States eventually took side with the protesters. US 
President Barack Obama publicly stated in February that he was ”deeply  concerned by reports of 
violence in Bahrain, Libya and Yemen”, and that “ the United States condemns the use of 
violence by governments against peaceful protesters in those countries and wherever else it  may 
occur”. Then, after additional evidence about extremely repressive actions, he also bluntly urged 
Colonel Gaddafi “to step down” from power. Some public statements of support are certainly  not 
enough to delete years of funding and the propping up of corrupt and cruel dictatorships but they 
are undoubtedly a first step in the right direction.
Al Qaeda, and Islamic fundamentalists in general, should be extremely worried about another 
aspect of these revolts. From what  we hear and read, protesters are calling for the institution of 
some form of democracy in their countries. Democracy is bad news for terrorists. Democracy, in 
fact, offers institutional and peaceful channels to express public grievances, whether these be 
political, economic or social in nature. A democratic political system, therefore, noticeably 
reduces the appeal of violent terrorist strategies and markedly  dries up the pool of new recruits. 
Indeed, the necessity  of killing someone, or even to kill yourself in the process, in order to 
achieve a specific goal looks less and less evident.
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Make no mistake, democracy  is no panacea. It will not necessarily resolve economic and social 
problems, thus generating disillusion and frustration likely to lead to new social unrest. 
Revolutions may be also hijacked by illiberal forces and therefore derailed from their original 
democratic program. However, democracy in Arab countries is still one of the best weapons to 
fight the threat of Islamic terrorism. This is why the West should take the lead in helping these 
recently  born-again states to grow prosperous and stable. Although, it is critically important that 
Western assistance be consistent, whole-hearted and without any hidden strings attached. 
Eugenio Lilli is currently a PhD student  at the King’s College’s War Studies Department. His 
research focuses on the history of US foreign policy and on the impact of the Obama 
administration on the US Global War on Terror.
This was originally  published on the 07/04/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/journal/
opinionpieces/opinionpieces/files/lilli-revolts-in-the-arab-world.html
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Gangs and Terrorist: Dangerous Classmates in Minnesota’s Somali 
Community.
by Christopher Brown
US Navy
School Bells to Police Sirens
Morning television programs are suddenly interrupted across the world as pictures of frightened 
people running panicked through downtown city streets fill the airwaves.  In the background, 
smoke and flames billow from a towering icon of the cityscape.  Panic grips the US as security 
goes on high alert across the nation, bringing a virtual standstill to transportation and commerce. 
The Commodities Exchange closes during the middle of the day  sending shockwaves through the 
global financial establishment.
Hold the presses.  This is not the World Trade Center of New York City on 9/11/01 or 2/26/93 
nor is it  the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City on 4/19/95. The 
cameras focus on the former Sears Tower of Chicago in the not too distant future.  Al-Queda 
linked Al-Shabab has attacked the tallest building in the US in the middle of the heartland.  More 
terrifying, the ground work was laid not  in the training camps of Sub-Saharan Africa, but the 
playgrounds of Minneapolis, MN.
Somali Gangs Come of Age
Somali refugees began settling in Minnesota in the early 1990’s to escape the turmoil of their 
native land as the government failed and militants took control. While the community  as a whole 
was welcoming, the inner city  schools where the children found themselves were not.  Born out 
of the need for self protection from existing gangs, the Somali teens formed loosely  organized 
gangs beginning in 2000.  The Somali gangs eventually turned to criminal activities, beginning 
with muggings and burglary. Recently, the gangs changed revenue streams to sex trafficking and 
credit card fraud due to lower risk with a higher profitability. [1] The Somali gangs are driven by 
monetary gain and show a high adaptability to new opportunities.
Term Papers to Terrorism
While gangs are not uncommon to modern urban America, a more disturbing trend has beset the 
same community.  Beginning in 2007 and continuing through January of 2009 [2] as many as 
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two dozen Somali teens have disappeared from the Minneapolis community. [3] Of the missing 
Minnesotan Somali teens, 5 have been killed [4] in actions including suicide bombings. [5]
NPR’s Dina Temple-Raston reports that some of the young men have returned from Somalia. [6] 
Community leaders say that the youth were disillusioned by  what they saw and do not pose a 
threat. [7]  However, their return poses a more disturbing issue than their departure.  No one 
knows how they were able to re-enter the country.  Their documentation was confiscated at the 
training camps. [8]
BFF: Bomb-transporting For Funds
Looked at in a vacuum, the troubles with the Minnesota Somali youth populations raise concern 
for any  local and state government.  But across the country on the opposite border, trends are 
developing that should raise the Minneapolis trouble to the level of National Security Risk.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations maintain the overland routes for drugs and other illicit 
materials.  Although, the Mexican drug traffickers produce little heroin and cocaine, they  account 
for a large share of heroin and an estimated 90% of cocaine transported into and distributed 
throughout the US. [9] With money as their motivation, drug traffickers have set their sights on 
an industry worth $15 to $20 billion a year in Mexico. [10] Drug traffickers are diversifying into 
human smuggling. [11]
At the same time the US Customs and Border Patrol has seen a significant increase in the 
numbers of Other Than Mexicans (OTMs) caught crossing border.  In 2001, OTMs numbered 
only 5,251. [12] By 2006 the number had soared to 108,025 and included individuals from 
Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. [13] Beyond the increasing 
numbers of prayer rugs and Arabic marked trash, Border Patrol agents found a book titled, “In 
Memory of Our Martyrs.” This treatise celebrates the lives of Islamic suicide bombers and other 
militants who died carrying out jihadist attacks. [14] The Mexican drug traffickers are 
demonstrating an affinity for transporting anyone across the border that pays the price 
irrespective of ideology. 
Furthermore, half way across the world, evidence has surfaced of Al-Shabab doing business with 
Somali Pirates.  During a recent interview, Saeed Yare, a Somali pirate from Bosasso stated, 
“(Pirates) in other towns give cash to Islamist in order to continue their business.  Al-Shabab is 
just another pirate group.” [15] Like the Mexican drug traffickers, Al-Shabab does business with 
anyone who can forward their cause without consideration for ideology.
Head of the Class
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Back on the Minneapolis playground, gang members and jihadists have been classmates and 
friends for years.  No need exists for introductions through seedy business partners and possible 
federal agents.  No discussions take place to establish a tense partnership between two 
organizations that  don’t completely trust  each other. The gang members and jihadists feel a 
kinship; both chose a different path to deal with the same disenfranchisement that they feel 
towards the larger community around them.  The fire was lit long ago, the water is already to a 
boil, if the situation is not handled quickly and carefully, the pressure cooker will explode.
Christopher Brown is a Armor Subject Matter Expert (SME) and an Anti-Terror/Force Protection 
SME for the US Navy. Recently, Christopher added a deeper understanding of the underlying 
human element to his Anti-Terror/Force Protection expertise with his successful completion of 
the University of St Andrews CSTPV Certificate in Terrorism Studies.
This was originally published on the 26/04/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/journal/
opinionpieces/opinionpieces/files/b243462695709155de7f5a793721f7f0-7.html
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The Peril of Hasty Triumphalism and Osama bin Laden’s Death
by Eugenio Lilli
King’s College London
On May 1, 2011 the headlines of a large number of newspapers and TV channels around the 
world were saying “justice has been done”. Those were the words used by  the US President 
Barack Obama to announce to the world the killing of Osama bin Laden, the number one 
terrorist on the US most-wanted list. 
Exactly  eight years earlier, on May 1, 2003, another US President, George W. Bush gave a 
famous speech declaring the end of major combat operations in Iraq. President Bush delivered 
the speech on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln under a banner titled “Mission 
Accomplished”.
Hasty triumphalism turned out to be profoundly misleading in the case of Iraq. It may  be wise 
not to make the same mistake regarding the fight against international terrorism in general, and 
against Al-Qaeda in particular.
The killing of the Arab Sheik Osama bin Laden obviously represents an extremely  important 
achievement in the global effort  against international terrorism. First and foremost, it puts an end 
to one of the major criticisms to the US military  intervention in Afghanistan. “Osama bin Laden 
was why the United States went to war in Afghanistan” correctly  writes the Washington Post[1]. 
The disturbing fact that bin Laden was still free and alive would have prevented the United 
States to consider the Afghan War a complete success, no matter the possible significant  results 
in other areas, such as, for example, the democratic stabilization of the country. Secondly, the 
death of the leader of the terrorist organization responsible for the September 11th attacks bears 
with it  a certain sense of justice and retribution for those directly or indirectly affected by such 
attacks.
Osama’s demise may also result  in a morale boost for the United States. A positive shake after a 
decade during which the conflict in Afghanistan has dragged on and on without substantial 
improvements. In addition, it generates a widespread sense of unity at a time of harsh partisan 
division within US politics. As reported by The New York Times, the US administration “drew 
praise from unlikely quarters”, even from Republicans such as former Vice President  Dick 
Cheney, New York’s former Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, and a likely challenger for the 2012 
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presidential election Donald J. Trump[2]. As far as electoral politics are concerned, the killing of 
the Arab Sheik represents a great accomplishment for President Obama. And although it will not 
make disappear other, mostly  economic, challenges lying ahead, it will probably increase 
Obama’s chances of re-election for a second term next year.
However, there are several reasons to be skeptical about the far-reaching effects of Osama’s 
death on the global effort against international terrorism. As pointed out by  several studies[3], Al 
Qaeda has developed into a loose and decentralized network of independent cells, with no clear 
hierarchical chain of command. After 9/11 bin Laden, in fact, has mostly  been acting as a source 
of inspiration for other terrorists, which have been independently  planning and carrying out their 
plots, as it apparently  was the case in the March 11th 2003 attacks in Madrid. Therefore, cutting 
the head of an organization which has no head may have little or no significant effects on the 
ability of such organization to strike again in the future.
Moreover, the killing of Osama bin Laden may have the unintended consequence of making him 
a martyr and to increase the appeal of his figure and his message. According to the Al Qassam 
website, which is closely  associated with the Islamic movement Hamas, Ismail Haniya, the 
Palestinian Prime Minister of the Gaza government, strongly condemned Osama’s assassination 
and mourned him as an Arab holy warrior[4]. A better solution would have probably  been to 
capture the Sheik, give him a fair trial and imprison him for crimes he had already claimed to be 
responsible for. That would have depicted Bin Laden as a criminal and not as a martyr.
Finally, by eliminating Osama bin Laden the United States addressed only  one, although highly 
important, symptom of international terrorism. In fighting terrorism the distinction between 
symptoms and underlying causes is critical. Experts generally  agree that both elements of the 
terrorist threat should be dealt with[5]. Individual terrorists, terrorist organizations, sponsor states 
and host states are all examples of symptoms of terrorism. The underlying causes, instead, could 
be defined as the reasons why  people make the decision to turn to the strategy of terrorism. A 
policy of counter-terrorism strictly focused on the cure of the symptoms may be effective in the 
short term but not in the long one. Indeed, if the underlying causes are dismissed the terrorist 
threat would be stopped until a new generation of terrorists will start to fight for the same 
reasons. A more effective response, therefore, should deal also with such underlying causes, as 
for example with the enabling environment from which the terrorists draw support and recruit 
new members.
All that considered, President Obama's satisfaction in announcing the death of Osama bin Laden 
and the subsequent joyous and relieved response of the American people is both understandable 
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and legitimate. However, as in the past, hasty triumphalism could prove deceptive, in so far as it 
could lead the United States to believe that the global effort against international terrorism is 
close to an end.
Eugenio Lilli is currently a PhD student  at the King’s College’s War Studies Department. His 
research focuses on the history of US foreign policy and on the impact of the Obama 
administration on the US Global War on Terror.
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Book Reviews
Donald Liddick. Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements. 
Westport, Connecticut, Praeger Publishers, 2006. Hardcover $39.95, pp. 300. ISBN-13: 
978-0-27598-535-6 Reviewed by Michael Loadenthal, Georgetown University, Washington, 
D.C., US
Since the “eco-terrorism” movement was first  identified by the United States government as 
presenting the ‘number one domestic security threat,’ a number of books and academic articles 
seeking to address the issue have emerged.  Generally these scholarly  pieces of work have tended 
to examine these movements through only their most extreme manifestations (e.g. bomb attacks, 
large scale arsons), failing to contextualize such incidents within a larger political praxis. 
Though ample literature discussing the movement’s ideological development, historical roots and 
tactical overview exist, Donald Liddick’s 2006 book, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and 
Animal Liberation Movements, is one of the lone examples which aims to develop an incident-
based picture of the movement.  Liddick’s book is broken down into seven distinct units, and 
while all deserve unique attention, Chapter 6 “Structure and Modus Operandi of Radical 
Movements,” presents the widest breadth of new contributions to the field.
In this chapter, Liddick utilizes a methodology  which aims to describe the larger “eco-terrorist” 
movement via an incident-based analysis focused on tactics, geographic distribution and group 
claim.  This approach is commendable as previous studies have supplemented such a measured 
analysis with broad strokes bordering on sensationalism and alarmist rhetoric.  The problem 
present in Liddick’s study, however, is that the author’s dataset is small to the point of limitation, 
and additionally, his categorical taxonomy is exceedingly inclusive.  Liddick’s methodology 
leads to the determination that  “the vast majority of [“eco-terrorist”] crimes…are not properly 
classified as terrorism” (p. 74).  Though Liddick’s findings are not contested, the limitations to 
this finding require further interrogation.  
First, the Liddick dataset contains only  2,836 incidents occurring between 1956 and 2005, 
amounting to nearly  58 incidents per year.  This sampling is exceedingly limiting, when for 
example, a single group  like the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) can claim up  to five hundred 
attacks in a single year.  As Liddick’s study includes data from the ALF as well as over 100 
additional groups, one is forced to inquire why his annual samples are so small.  Liddick’s book 
reports that the larger “eco-terrorist” movement produces thousands of attacks, yet when those 
attacks are tallied, the numbers consistently show a propensity for the overrepresentation of the 
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dramatic (e.g. assault, explosives), and a wholesale disregarding of the mundane (e.g. vandalism, 
sabotage).  This patterning begs the question: if this movement is responsible for such a large 
scale of attacks, why is the study’s dataset based on such a selective pool?  
The Liddick dataset is based on “the most readily  accessible online sources…[and] Ron Arnold’s 
1997 book Ecoterror” (p. 72), and although the author states that the dataset  is not “exhaustive,” 
a tacit acknowledgment of this oversight does not  equate to a more accurate movement portrayal. 
Liddick makes it clear that the dataset represents “only  a fraction of all animal liberation and 
radical environmental actions,” but fails to explain why such a selective pool is chosen beyond 
convenience (p. 73).
Not only is Liddick’s sample small, containing for example, six UK incidents per year, he also 
fails to separate clandestine, cell-based activities from that of public militant  protest and civil 
disobedience.  For example, included in the tactical scope of Liddick’s study is “protesting 
without a permit,” “hanging banners,” and “staging demonstrations at private homes,” activities 
which are prevalent but typically excluded from such discussions, as such actions are effectively 
carried out by identifiably public groups such as Greenpeace, and in the case of home 
demonstrations, Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty  (SHAC).  Because these tactics are employed 
by membership-based groups, and not ALF-modeled, clandestine cell networks, to include their 
activities in a combined discussion incorrectly represents distinct tendencies as a singular 
movement.  This mixing of the illegal and legal, clandestine and publicly  disruptive, creates a 
conflation between groups such as the ALF which explicitly do not engage in public events, and 
those of Greenpeace which engage in disruptive civil disobedience and occasional sabotage. 
Traditionally, groups such as Greenpeace are excluded from discussions of “eco-terrorism” due 
to divergent strategy, tactical constraints and the nature of group membership.  Liddick’s study 
attempts to utilize an extremely limited dataset to draw conclusions applicable to diverse strands 
of the political spectrum that share only a basic motivational base, yet are radically separate in 
terms of means and goals.
Liddick's incident-based analysis and quantitative research makes numerous important 
contributions to the literature of “eco-terrorism”, although it is disappointing in the scope and 
scale of its inquiry. He also offers a unique and extensive movement history focusing on 
ideological development and group splintering (Chapters 2-5), as well as ethnographic profiles of 
individual activists (Chapter 7), that are of value to both academics and practitioners.  However, 
while Liddick's quantitative research portions represent an attempt to correct the methodological 
gaps in the wider field’s production of academic literature, much of the book serves as a retelling 
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of the oft-cited history of ideological formulation, movement factionalization and future 
predictions.
This review was originally published on the 13/01/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/
journal/bookreviews/files/liddick_ecoterrorism.html
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Graham Fuller. A World Without Islam. London: Little, Brown and Company, 2010. Paperback 
£13.99; pp. 336. ISBN-13: 978-0316041195, Reviewed by  Gilbert Ramsay, University of St 
Andrews, St Andrews, UK
Is Islam inherently in conflict with democracy, with liberalism, with ‘the West’? Or is Islam just 
a façade for the real issues that are at stake? This question has been asked and answered so many 
times in the past twenty years or so (usually in favour of the latter view) that authors now have to 
work ever harder for new angles on the subject. In A World Without Islam, Graham Fuller takes 
the big question to its logical conclusion. What if Islam had never existed at all? 
The idea is, if nothing else, provocative. Interesting counterfactuals abound in Middle Eastern 
history. Islam took over a Late Roman Levant which was already theologically at odds with 
Constantinople. Does that mean that government agencies might today be warning of the 
prospect of suicide attacks by radical ‘home grown’ Syriac Orthodox? Had Genghis Khan 
converted to Nestorian Christianity (as it was rumoured he might), and thus evaded assimiliation 
by conversion, would we now be told that the Mongol inheritance of Middle Eastern countries 
predisposed them to tribalism and violence? 
Fuller acknowledges such possibilities. But – perhaps a bit deceptively – this isn’t really a book 
of alternative history. This may be for the best. Such thought experiments make for fun essays, 
but it seems questionable that the exercise could offer the basis for a whole book. The problem, 
however, is that Fuller also fails really to seize on the important questions that his speculation 
might raise. Instead what we get is wishy-washy history and bland apologetic. 
Fuller’s intentions are interesting. He perceives the chance to creatively reappraise the history of 
the region by starting with everything left once Islam itself is subtracted. Is the contemporary 
relationship of Western countries with the Middle East really the legacy of ancient, pre-Islamic 
history? Or is this invented tradition which merely clothes geopolitical interest? Or are the 
enduring geo-strategic situations of the Middle East and Europe products of some fundamental 
engine of history which has, in turn, become written into culture? These are questions which 
have provoked some of the greatest minds on both sides of the putative divide right back to Ibn 
Khaldun and even (perhaps in itself evidence for Fuller’s case), Herodotus. Moreover, simply 
asking them challenges us to think about what it really means to be anti-essentialist. Is it actually 
determinism by ‘Islam’ which we are concerned about, or is it ‘Islamic culture’ (an argument 
whose circularity Roy has usefully drawn attention to).[1] 
Unfortunately, Fuller seems almost afraid of exploring the big ideas his premise invokes. Instead 
of the bold argument we are promised, what we mostly get is narrative history  - of a rather 
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sweeping, opinionated kind. For example, we learn on page 80 that Sixth century Syrian 
resentment of Byzantium had everything, apparently, to do with long-term cultural hatreds, and 
nothing to do with more immediate factors (such as brutal, draining wars with the neighbouring 
Sassanian Persian Empire). Indeed, a few lines later (p. 81), we are told about the third century 
warrior queen Zenobia’s hostility to Rome that ‘tellingly, she was descended from nobility in 
Carthage - another city that famously nurtured historical hatred of its chief Mediterranean rival, 
Rome’. Firstly, there is no evidence that Zenobia was really of Carthaginian ancestry. She liked 
to claim descent from the mythical queen Dido, but this says more about her contemporary 
rivalry with Rome (framed, incidentally, in terms of Roman mythology) than any real feelings of 
cultural animosity. Secondly, for what it is worth, Carthage (a completely new city, built on the 
site of Rome’s one time rival, which had been razed to the ground), had at this time been a loyal 
Roman city and capital of the imperial province of Africa for four hundred years. It is perhaps 
this casual attitude to the telescoping of history and the reifying of retrospectively invented 
tradition which leads Fuller to subtitle a chapter on Russia’s present day relations with its 
Muslim minorities ‘Byzantium lives!’!
Whether substituting cultural determinism for theological determinism is really much of a step 
forward is, of course, moot. After all, Western popular culture seems perfectly capable of 
dreaming up the same negative orientalist stereotypes for pre-Islamic periods as for post-Islamic 
ones. But having set off down this road, one might at least expect some interesting scenery on 
the way. Unfortunately, Fuller goes on to miss many of the more interesting points that this line 
of argument might suggest. He is eager to point out that Islam shares many similarities with 
Christianity and Judaism. No one denies it. But such is his reverence for orthodox Muslim 
accounts of Islamic history that he largely bypasses a whole school of important, if controversial, 
revisionism which might, at the least have added some zest to his case. According to this, Islam 
did not spring fully formed from the revelations and deeds of its prophet, but rather in a process 
of accretion, taking place over roughly two centuries, in which an elite of Arab conquerors 
gradually combined elements of Christianity and Judaism, together with a miscellany of their 
own oracular heritage, to produce a partially retrofitted tradition which, expediently, helped 
guard against cultural assimilation into the conquered. If so, the very origins of Islam might be 
said to have their roots in the underlying political culture of the Middle East, rather than vice 
versa. Fuller is happy to note similarities between some strands of late antique Christian thought 
and Islam. But he prefers to use this as a jumping off point for lambasting the small mindedness 
of those who would fight over mere details in religion. This might be useful rhetoric, but it seems 
like poor argumentation. After all, even the most dyed in the wool essentialist would hardly deny 
the similarities between monotheistic religions. The question is where the differences come from, 
and whether they actually matter.  
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Indeed, for a book with such an imaginative premise, the fundamental flaw in this work is lack of 
imagination. Ironically, given his liberal vision, Fuller seems so wrapped up in his own world 
view that he cannot even countenance the possibility that there could be any truth to the position 
against which he is arguing. As a result, he seems not to see the need to actually make his case. 
For instance, he flatly asserts on numerous occasions that where religion seems to be a source of 
unpleasantness, it is inevitably the result of political interference. ‘It is really the cultural glue of 
theology - any theology - that sustains a community on an ethnic and religious basis’, he tells us. 
‘The religion can be Judaism, Christianity or Islam; it doesn’t really matter’ (p. 37). True religion 
is all about ‘personal life, philosophy and conduct’ (p.38). If it gets nasty, then it must be ‘the 
exploitation of religion for secular ends’. (p.12). Without the state, theological decisions would 
merely be about ‘obscure proceedings of theologians sitting solemnly in council’ (p.48)  and, in 
any case, these wouldn’t matter very much as ‘heresy gets a bad rap’, but is actually ‘in the eye 
of the beholder’ (p.38). Fair enough. But Fuller offers no explanation for why things must be this 
way round (though much later he nods to the issue as a ‘chicken and egg problem’- p. 62). Nor 
does he recognise any possible objection. After all, if the specificities of religion matter so little, 
if politics always trumps it, then why did the Roman emperor Diocletian’s attempt to impose an 
official version of paganism fail, while his successor, Constantine, was able to establish an 
already unstoppable looking tide of Christianity as the state religion of the empire? For scholars 
like Rodney Stark monotheistic religions like Christianity have built-in sociological 
characteristics which help to ensure their viral success.[2] Fuller barely even recognises that such 
views exist. 
By parts two and three of the book, Fuller has – it seems – more or less abandoned the entire 
project. In presenting sweeping chapters on the status of Muslims in rival Huntingtonian 
‘civilisations’ of Russia, India, China and the West and on Islam’s troubled encounter with 
modernity, Fuller offers a decent synthesis, but very little that is original. The bold imaginary of 
a ‘world without Islam’ has decayed to yet another well-meaning refutation of essentialist claims 
about Islam.  What would the world be like without this book? Not much different, one has to 
assume.  
This review was originally published on the 13/01/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/
journal/bookreviews/files/fuller_aworldwithoutislam.html
Notes
[1] O. Roy, (trans. C Volk) The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1994
[2] R. Stark, The Rise of Christianity, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1997
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John Calvert. Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010, pp. vii+377, (Hardback). ISBN978-0-231-70104-4, Reviewed by Mohamed 
Daadaoui, Oklahoma City University, Oklahoma City, O.K., US
John Calvert’s Sayyid Qutb and The Origins of Radical Islamism is an ambitious investigation 
into the life and thoughts of Sayyid Qutb at a distance from al-Qaedism and similar radical 
Islamism. The book is a contextualized approach to the life and thought of Sayyid Qutb, which 
seeks to go beyond points of similarity between Qutb’s fiery and uncompromising ideas and 
contemporary  militant  violent Islamism. For Calvert, Qutb’s Islamism is a function of the post-
independence Egypt caught between crises of modernization and subsequent authoritarian 
regime. Calvert’s biographical book is chronologically  organized to mirror the trajectory of 
Qutb’s ideas and views of the state and society from early  rural upbringing to his eventual 
execution at the hands of Nasser’s state in 1966.
British occupation of Egypt would serve as one of the main points of contest in Qutb’s early 
discourse and foment his early  nationalist  zeal. In this period, Calvert  weaves a seamless 
intellectual mosaic of Qutb’s thought from the early  years in Dar al ‘Ulum, where he studied 
teaching and education methods to his later revolutionary Islamist discourse most exemplified in 
his treatise Milestones. Qutb’s early literary aspirations spawned of his close association with 
Egyptian literary stalwart ‘Abbas Mahmud al- ’Aqqad. In this period, Qutb seemed less radical 
and more conciliatory, for instance, in his argument for a limited role for religion in the arts (pp.
72-73) and for his literary muses with romantic poetry and criticism of neoclassic poets.
The end of WWII period saw Qutb’s early creative and aesthetic analyses of the Qur’an, which 
will later provide the basis for his seminal commentary on the Qur’an, In the Shade of the 
Qur’an. Qutb’s literary approach to Qur’anic studies is less preoccupied with semantics and 
grammar and more with the hidden artistic qualities of “rhythm, the sound of words, and the 
symmetry of images” in the holy  book (p.113). This approach reawakened Qutb’s inner Islamist 
long perched beneath the modern Cairene Effendi look. 
Faithful to his contextualized approach, Calvert points out to two main factors that contributed to 
the early radicalization of dissident effendis like Qutb. First the general post-WWII self-
determination/anti- colonial movement, and the growing Zionist project in Palestine, which will 
become the cause célèbre for generations of Arab nationalists and Islamists alike (pp.116-117). 
Qutb viewed western colonialism as the source of all socio-economic ills and cultural corruption 
of Muslims societies. Themes that Qutb punctuate in his Social Justice in Islam’s sharp call for 
Muslim reform and a return to a pre-modern Islamic concept of justice to restore balanced order 
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in society away from western manifestations of materialism and decadence. Qutb’s anti-western 
views will find their affirmation during his “American Sojourn.”
Studying education methods in Greeley, Colorado in 1948, Qutb’s lamented the social inertia, 
decay and sexual permissiveness in US society. A man of dark complexions, Qutb was 
particularly critical of racial segregation at the height of “Jim Crow” laws in the US (pp.
148-149). His cultural and ethical rebuke of the US amounts to what Calvert, through Syrian 
cultural critic Sadiq al-‘Azm terms as “Orientalism in Reverse,” which is the tendency of 
Easterners to “validate the Self in relation to the Other in the modern period” (p.153).
Upon his return to Egypt in the early 1950s, Qutb wrote his commentary on the Qur’an (In The 
Shade of the Qur’an) in 1954,  two years after the Free Officers Movement coup d’état against 
King Farouk. Qutb joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1953 and endorsing and working with the 
Free Officers during the early post-putsch days. However, as Nasser moved to exact his 
authoritarian control of Egypt, Nasser would view the Muslim Brotherhood as subversive agents. 
Consequently, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned and Qutb imprisoned after a botched 
assassination attempt against Nasser. 
In jail, Qutb becomes more radicalized in his discourse vis-à-vis the police state of Nasser. 
During this period, Qutb authored several books that culminated in his Milestones in 1964, in 
which he condemned Jahili societies, a rReference to the pre-Islamic age of “ignorance,” and 
modern Muslim societies, thatwhich have subverted God’s sovereignty  to a man-made form of 
governance. Qutb advocated a return to the contentions concept of Jihad as a struggle against 
Islam’s enemies, including the Egyptian state.
Such views will serve as a template for later generations of radical Islamists, and would seal 
Qutb’s fate as Nasser’s regime moved to quell the subversive effect of Qutb’s ideas under 
trumped up  charges of complicity with anti-government forces. Despite offers of clemency in 
exchange forof Qutb’s admission of guilt, he steadfastly embraced his fate to the very last minute 
when he was executed in 1966. Qutb’s “Martyrdom” will serve as rallying force for generations 
of radical takfirist Islamists that took advantage of Qutb’s Jahiliyya concept to “excommunicate” 
millions of Muslims and launch a global terror campaign. 
Calvert’s book is judicious as he painstakingly sketches out a portrait of the making of a 
revolutionary  Islamist. As Calvert shows, Qutb’s intellectual progression is gradual and has to be 
disaggregated from the common quick association with modern militant and violent Islamism of 
al-Qaeda et al. The narrative Calvert writes is masterful in its contextualization of Qutb’s views 
as a response to the tumultuous times of post-colonial Egypt and the brutal dictatorship of 
Nasser.
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Buried in Calvert’s rich details of the contentious Nasserite regime in Egypt is an inexplicable 
reference to polemical Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan, son of Said Ramadan, who fled Nasserite 
persecution in 1956. The reference is tangential and appears ad hoc and irrelevant to the 
chronological flow of events. Calverts seems to reduce the intellectual worth of Tariq Ramadan 
to that of “da’wist” finishing the Brotherhood’s work from the 1950s and 60s in Europe. Perhaps 
Calvert is guilty of the same guilt  by association that  many critics of Tariq Ramadan are, 
questioning the motives of Ramadan in light of his ancestors’ Muslim Brotherhood credentials. 
Less important are some problems with transliteration. In two cases, Calvert  mis-transliterates 
first the word Jahili as Jalili (p.58) and Hadith (present/contemporary) as Hadir (p. 67). Despite 
these few shortcomings, Calvert’s book is a well-researched and written biography of arguably 
the most important figure in modern militant Islam. It is recommended for both its depth and 
breadth, and novel Qutbist-centric approach at a distance from modern linkages to al-Qaedism.
This review was originally published on the 24/01/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/
journal/bookreviews/files/calvert_sayyidqutb.html
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Gilles Kepel. Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East. Cambridge, MA, 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University  Press, 2008. Paperback $27.95, pp. 336. ISBN: 
9780674031388, Reviewed by Scott Nicholas Romaniuk , University  of Aberdeen , Aberdeen, 
United Kingdom
Gilles Kepel, French analyst of the Muslim world, and one of the foremost experts on political 
Islam, delivers a detailed analysis of divergent strategies and objectives within the contemporary 
war on terror. His critique of the subject matter is based on two “grand narratives” – President 
George W. Bush’s “global war on terror” and Al Qaeda’s murderous jihad. The Bush 
administration’s war against the “axis of evil” was a deliberate reprise of the Regan 
administration’s struggle against the Soviet “evil empire” implemented in 1983.  However, as 
Kepel demonstrates with stunning precision, “in formulating this analogy between the war on 
terror and the Cold War, the Bush administration ignored several fundamental differences 
between the former Eastern bloc and the Middle East” (p. 4).
The general portrayal of Al Qaeda operations rarely tells the story of opposition to the most 
comprehensive campaign against global terror. Kepel reasons that, in challenging President 
Bush’s war on terror, “Bin Laden and his followers sought to perpetuate the strategy of 
‘martyrdom operations’ that had shocked the world on 9/11” (p. 5), and that Bin Laden’s 
followers would “accomplish their aims through voluntary death in combat, in a sublime, 
phantasmagorical act of self-sacrifice on the part of believers” (p. 5). Transcending the grand 
narratives presented within this work, Kepel argues that  jihadism was an abortive attempt to 
coalesce the forces of global Islam.  Based primarily on secondary sources, this book provides a 
framework with which political officials and many  within the analytic community might further 
understand America’s war on terror as an articulation of the very policy objectives put into 
practice by the United States in the Middle East since the end of the Second World War.
Comprised of six chapters, Kepel begins with an evaluative approach of United States operations 
in the Middle East, and what was expected to be a “new American century” (p. 1). Chapter two 
synthesizes martyrdom operations among Shiite Islamists, Sunnis, and “Third Worldists” while 
drawing parallels between earlier crises and America’s debacle in Iraq. It addresses 
Ahmadinejad’s use of Quranic parlance to depict the violent writhe between “oppressors and 
oppressed” (p. 64). Chapter three explores Islamist resistance following the American occupation 
of Iraq. It  underscores the growing “base of jihad” and allegiance to Bin Laden’s malicious 
campaigns launched against New York, Madrid, and London, as well as those in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Chapters four and five examine Al Qaeda’s vehement action in Europe, the global 
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Islamic resistance, and international opposition to the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 
doing so, Kepel asserts that, “if the grand narrative of the war on terror saw the proliferation of 
jihad as leading Europe’s decline, its mirror image – the grand narrative of jihad through 
martyrdom – also saw Europe as decadent, but in a difference way” (p. 175). Chapter six 
considers forces that underpinned neo-conservative ideology during the Bush era, the 
transformation of the United States’ role, and Europe’s part in the growing crisis in the Middle 
East. It exemplifies the growing multi-polarity in an increasingly complex global corridor, and 
poses the argument that the United States “has no choice but to abandon ideology and go back to 
politics” (p. 278).
One of the major strengths of this book is the linkage established between a mutual failure on 
both sides to formulate enduring democracy on one side and Islamic unity  on the other. 
Operating in a very familiar environment of scholarly inquiry, Kepel remarkably weaves together 
cultural perspectives, the dynamic forces of religion and fundamental extremism, and the 
practice of political strategy regionally and internationally.
The principle gap in this book is evident through its lack of focus on other democratic and 
Islamic nation’s occupations and motivations in the global war on terror and the subsequent 
response to it. As a consequence, identifying the fundamental changes taking place elsewhere 
political, socially, and culturally, is evident. Kepel equally does not discuss how the practice of 
other players, such as state actors and international organizations integrate with other forms of 
determination and potential resolution on practical levels. 
These shortcomings aside, Beyond Terror and Martyrdom represents a valuable contribution to 
the literature of political science and international affairs, and will serve as a vital tool for 
analytical inquiry by academics and students. Far from dictating the need to follow the paths of 
X, Y, and, Z, Kepel’s provocative reflection serves as a critical calling for policymakers to 
assume a more realistic approach and constructive policy platform for engaging with issues that 
plague an exceedingly volatile region and uncertain time.
This review was originally published on the 02/02/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/
journal/bookreviews/files/92d1d3a25dab4f35a4543a76e244b2aa-5.html
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Justin Gest. Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West. London, Hurst & Company, 
2010. Cloth, 256 pages, ISBN: 978-0-231-70188-4, $35.00 Reviewed by Alison McConnell, 
Gulu Support the Children Organisation (GUSCO),Gulu, Uganda
Apart examines the differences between young European Muslims that operate within the 
democratic system and those that actively  oppose it or withdraw completely.  Gest finds 
traditional Structuralist accounts of alienation and engagement insufficient for two reasons. First, 
sociological conditions have evolved since these accounts were created; and second, these 
accounts fail to explain different methods of engagement from people of similar socio-economic 
statuses. 
To fill this void, Gest puts forth a new model which differentiates between those that actively 
engage with the democratic system and those that he refers to as anti-system. “To put it simply, 
anti-system behavior entails the belief that  the democratic society  and the referent individual no 
longer hold convergent interests- I call this belief ‘apartism’” (Gest, 2010:64).  Gest divides anti-
system behavior into two types of engagement: active and passive. Active anti-system behavior 
is aimed at defeating the existing system while passive anti-system behavior involves a complete 
rejection or withdrawal from the existing system. 
To test his model and examine the differences between individuals and their method of 
engagement, Gest compares two case studies based on over 100 interviews. The first case study 
is the Bangladeshi community in London’s East End and the second case study is the Moroccan 
community  in and around Lavapies, Madrid. Strengths of Gest’s work include his in-depth 
analysis of both cases and his extensive methodology section which outlines and addresses all 
possible weaknesses and limitations of the study.
Gest concludes that the main differentiating factor between those that are anti-system and those 
that actively  engage is perception. “…I find that what distinguishes democratic activists from 
both forms of anti-system behavior is the nature of their individual expectations and perceptions 
about shared socio-political realities” (Gest, 2010:178).  Perception includes their expectation of 
the government, whether these expectations are attained and any  discrepancy  between 
expectation and attainment. This perception/discrepancy argument is similar to the argument 
made by Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel. However, in Apart, Gest applies this argument to 
individual activism more generally rather than solely to violent action.
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The book could have benefited from clarifying the difference between violent and non-violent 
active anti-system behavior. Or, if Gest believes that active anti-system behavior inherently 
involves violence, then this assumption needs to be clearly stated. Often, as we see with the 
concepts of radicalization and extremism, this difference is not emphasized despite being an 
important one.  
Overall, Apart  is a well written book whose findings have important policy implications for 
current counter-terrorism initiatives in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Indeed, from the results of this study, we see that the best way to predict the political behavior of 
individuals is to understand the way they interpret the world and its challenges. And worldviews 
are simply not demarcated physically. In fact, it is arguable that physical profiling does 
significantly more harm than good (Gest, 2010:219).
Arguments such as these, concerning the effectiveness of counter terrorism policy  and physical 
profiling are not unique. What makes Gest’s work stand APART is his level of qualitative 
analysis, his theoretical model and his call for counter terrorism policy  makers to measure “…the 
security effect of eliminating or mitigating those policies that most damage Muslim citizens’ 
faith in the political system”(Gest, 2010:219). Gest argues “[i]t is possible that the marginal 
increase in vulnerability is microscopic if other more effective policies are left subtly in 
place” (Gest, 2010:219).  
This review was originally published on the 02/02/11 at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~cstpv/
journal/bookreviews/files/gest-apart-alienated.html
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